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COURT FIXING
Tracey E. George*

Whatever the legacy of Bill Clinton's presidency, he made a lasting mark
on the federal judiciary. Clinton appointed 377 judges, representing nearly half of
the Article III judiciary.' He nominated an additional forty judges2 and thus came

Associate Professor of Law and Adjunct Associate Professor of Political
Science, University of Missouri. I presented an earlier version of this Article at the 2000
Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association and to the faculties at Case
Western Reserve University School of Law and Northwestern University School of Law,
and I benefitted from the comments of participants. For their helpful comments on this
project, I thank Marjorie George, Chris Guthrie, Robert Pushaw, Jennifer Segal, and Harold
Spaeth. I gratefully acknowledge Elizabeth LaFlamme and Andrea Myers for excellent
research assistance; Diane Collins, Steve Lambson, and Cindy Shearrer for valuable library
assistance; and the Missouri Law School Foundation for generous financial support.
1.
Clinton named 2 Supreme Court justices, 65 courts of appeals judges, 305
district courtjudges, and 5 Court of International Trade judges to lifetime appointments, or
nearly 45% of the 843 Article III judges. The Clinton appointment figures are derived from
the following sources: Alliance for Justice, JudicialSelection Project Annual Report 1999
(visited Feb. 27, 2001) <http.//vww.afj.orgjsp/tables.htmlgtl>; Federal Judicial Center,
Judges of the
United States
Courts (visited
Feb.
27,
2001)
<http'//air.fjc.gov/history/judgesfrmhtml>; U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
106th Congress Nominations Statistics, November 9, 2000 (visited Feb. 27, 2001)
<httpl/www.senate.gov/-judiciary/lO6stats.htm>. These figures only include life-time
judicial appointments confirmed by the Senate, and thus do not reflect Clinton's recess
appointment of Roger Gregory to the Fourth Circuit on December 27, 2000. See Dan
Eggen, Clinton Names Black Judge to Appeals Court (visited Dec. 27, 2000)
<http'//washingtonpost.com/vp-dyn/nation/ourtssupremecourt/20002001/A57051-2000D
ec27.html>. If Congress formally confirms Gregory at the end of his one-year temporary
appointment, he will become a permanent member of the Fourth Circuit, and Clinton will
tie Reagan's 378-judge record.
2.
See U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 106th Congress Nominations
Statistics, November 9, 2000, (visited Feb. 27, 2001) <httpI//%Av%.senate.gov/
-judiciary/106stats.htm> (listing 16 courts of appeals and 24 district court nominations as
pending for 66 vacancies); see also Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Judiciary
Now: The Latest News and Features:Judicial Vacancy Summary. Updated February 5,
*

2001 (visited Feb. 27, 2001) <http-J/vww.uscourts.gov/vacancies/summary.htm> (noting
that as of February 5, 2001, there were 29 court of appeals and 63 district court vacancies).
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very close to surpassing Ronald Reagan's record 378 appointments.3 He did not
achieve that goal, however, as the Republican-controlled Senate slowed the
confirmation process to a near standstill during the 2000 election year.4 Given that
nearly a quarter of the active federal judiciary was appointed by Reagan (who last
nominated a judge more than twelve years ago), Clinton should have left the Oval
Office5 confident that his judicial appointees will be making decisions for years to
come.

Clinton used his appointments to name liberal to moderate judges who
appeared to vote consistently with his "New Democrat" agenda.6 Conservatives

have criticized Clinton for appointing liberal activist judges, while liberals have
questioned whether Clinton's judicial appointments have been as liberal as prior
Democratic appointees. 7 The first systematic study of circuit and district court

3.
See Alliance for Justice, Judicial Selection Project Annual Report 1999
(visited Feb. 27, 2001) <http://www.afj.org/jsp/tables.html#tl>.
4.
See Alliance for Justice, 2000 Judicial Selection Project Update, October
30, 2000 (visited Feb. 27, 2001) <http://www.afj.org/jsp/notes.html> (reporting a statement
of Democratic Senator and Judiciary Committee Member Patrick Leahy that the Committee
held no confirmation hearings in August or September although 36 nominees were awaiting
hearings); Alliance for Justice, JudicialSelection ProjectAnnual Report 1999 (visited Feb.

27, 2001) <http://www.afj.org/jsp99.html#I#-a> (reporting that, in light of the delays in
Senate confirmation of Clinton nominees (170 days) and threats made by Republican
Senators to shut down the confirmation process, pending nominees face an uphill battle for
confirmation); Editorial:Held Hostage in the Senate, WASH. POST, May 7, 2000, at B6
(observing that the Senate has moved slowly on nominations in 2000 and arguing that the
Senate should follow the practice of previous Senate majorities that have confirmed an
opposing president's nominees in election years); Eric Pianin & Charles Babington, Long in
Limbo, Judge Finally Will Get a Ruling, WASH. POST, Mar. 6, 2000, at Al (describing the
decreasing numbers of nominees that have been confirmed by the Senate and observing that
"Republicans appear increasingly reluctant to approve more of Clinton's nominations
before the November election, hoping that Texas Gov. George W. Bush takes the White
House and begins making more conservative nominations").
5.
According to Patrick McGuigan, Director of the Judicial Reform Project of
the Institute for Government and Politics, "The Reagan legacy is probably going to be
found in his court appointments.. .far beyond any legislative initiatives." HERMAN
SCHWARTZ, PACKING THE COURTS:

THE CONSERVATIVE

CAMPAIGN TO REWRITE THE

3 (1988) (quoting McGuigan). •
In the 1996 presidential election, Republican challenger Bob Dole tried to
6.
make Clinton's judicial appointments to the lower courts a key issue in his campaign. See,
e.g., Harvey Berkman & Claudia MacLachlan, Don'tJudge a Book... Clinton's Picks-Not
So Liberal:More Judges are Minorities, Women, But Ike'dLike Them, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 21,
1996, at Al. He shouted to Republican Convention delegates in August 1996, "'For those
who say that I should not make President Clinton's liberal judicial appointments an issue of
this campaign, I have a simple response: I have heard your argument. The motion is
denied!'" Naftali Bendavid, GOP Measure Chips Away at Judicial Power, Discretion,
LEGAL TIMES, May 26, 1997, at 1 (quoting Dole's speech but concluding that "the issue
never really caught fire during the campaign").
7.
See, e.g., David Byrd, Clinton's Untilting FederalBench, NAT'L J., Feb. 19,
2000, at 555 (describing conservative interest groups' claims as well as liberal groups'
CONSTITUTION
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decisions by Clinton judges found that they indeed were not as liberal overall as
Carter judges, primarily because they were more likely to vote for the government

in criminal prosecutions.8 Clinton's circuit court appointees, however, were as
liberal as Carter's in civil rights and liberties cases, and Clinton's circuit and

district court appointees were more liberal than Republican appointees in all issue
areas. 9 These appointments reflect the President's own centrist perspectives on
many issues, his commitment to civil rights, and his tough-on-crime rhetoric.' 0
Political scientist Sheldon Goldman, an expert on judicial selection, concludes,
"From Clinton's perspective, he already has a legacy, and it's a pretty damn good
one.""I
George W. Bush also has the potential to leave a judicial legacy,
particularly as the Senate is (barely) controlled by his party and therefore should
laments about Clinton judges); Jeffrey Toobin, Clinton's Left-Hand Man, THE NEv
YoRKER, July 21, 1997, at 28, 29-30. Toobin argues that:
[T]he Clinton judges are an ideologically bland group. "The Clinton
appointments are philosophically moderate," says Nan Aron, the
president of the liberal Alliance for Justice, which monitors judicial
appointments. "Studies show that they have the same ideological
underpinnings as Gerald Ford's appointments. They're less liberal than
Jimmy Carter's." [Deputy Attorney General] Jamie Gorelick says, "On
choices of judicial candidates, the President has often been more
comfortable with the more middle-of-the-road, less doctrinaire

candidates."
Id.
8.

Ronald Stidham et at., The Voting Behavior of PresidentClinton's Judicial

Appointees, 80 JUDICATURE 16, 19, 20 (1996) (reporting that Carter's district court

appointees were more liberal than Clinton's in criminal justice cases (38% versus 34%), but
Clinton's appointees were more liberal than Nixon's (30%), Ford's (32%), Reagan's (23%),
or Bush's (29%), and that Carter's circuit appointees were much more liberal than Clinton's
in criminal justice cases (40% vs. 31%) though Clinton circuit judges were still more liberal
than Nixon (26%), Ford (20%), Reagan (26%), or Bush (22%) judges in the criminal justice
issue area).
9.
See id. (reporting that Clinton district judges were liberal in 48% of all cases
compared to Nixon (39%), Ford (44%), Reagan (36%), and Bush (37%) district judges and
finding that Carter and Clinton circuit judges were comparably liberal in civil rights and
liberties cases (42% versus 41%), an issue area in which the most liberal Republican
appointees in these cases, Ford appointees, took a liberal position 35% of the time and the
most conservative, Nixon appointees, took a liberal position 29% of the time); Byrd, supra
note 7, at 555 (describing political science professor Robert Carp's study of 60,000 federal
district court opinions that produced findings strikingly parallel to those found for circuit
court judges).
10.
See Carrie Johnson, FinalJudgment: The PresidentHas Been Criticized by
Left andRight. Maybe He Got the Bench He Wanted-And Deserved, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 6,
2000, at 10 (quoting Victoria Radd Rollins, associate counsel to President Clinton from
1994 to late 1995, who stated she ."believe[s] the president has been doing exactly what he
intended and wanted to accomplish in all these years. He nominated centrist judges who in
large part reflect his views on issues, with a deep commitment to representing women and
minorities on the bench."').
11.
Id. (quoting Goldman).
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be more receptive to his nominations. 2 As many as three Supreme Court justices,
including the Chief Justice, may retire in the next four years." 3 Almost
immediately, President Bush will be able to nominate judges for twenty-six
vacancies on the courts of appeals (nearly fifteen percent of the seats) and fiftyfour openings on the district courts (more than eight percent). 4 Congress could
add to that number by creating the sixty-nine judgeships requested by the U.S.
Judicial Conference, 5 a much more likely occurrence now that both houses are
controlled by the president's party. 6 Political parties and interest groups viewed
12.
See Christopher P. Banks, The Politics of Court Reform in the U.S. Courts of
Appeals, 5-11 (Sept. 1999) (unpublished paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the
American Political Science Association, on file with Author) (describing in detail the
Republican-controlled Senate's "war" on Clinton's judicial nominees); see generally
Geoffrey Peterson & David Hogberg, Nobody Expects the Spanish Inquisition: Judicial
Confirmation Hearings and Divided Government (Sept. 1999) (unpublished paper presented
at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, on file with Author)
(concluding, based on a finding that divided government significantly increases the length
of time a nominee languishes in the Senate Judiciary Committee, that a president's judicial
nominations face greater scrutiny when the Senate is dominated by a different party); Task
Force on Federal Judicial Selection, Justice Held Hostage: Politics and Selecting Federal
Judges, in UNCERTAIN JUSTICE: POLITICS AND AmERIcA's CouRTs 1, 36, 60 tbl. 11, 61 fig. 11
(Citizens for Independent Courts, An Initiative of The Constitution Project ed., 1999)
("During times when one party had control of the Senate and the other party of the White
House, the average number of days between nomination and final action was significantly
higher. This difference existed for both successful and unsuccessful nominees, but the
average time for unsuccessful nominees was much longer.").
13.
Three justices are at least 70 years old: Chief Justice William Rehnquist is
76 (10/1/1924), Justice John Paul Stevens is 80 (4/20/1920), and Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor is 71 (3/26/1930). See LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM
234-35 (1996). The next oldest justice is Ruth Bader Ginsburg at 68 (3/15/1933). See id,
at
230.
14.
See Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Judiciary Now: The Latest
News and Features: Judicial Vacancy Summary, Updated January 4,2001, (visited Feb.
27, 2001) <http://www.uscourts.gov/vacancies/summary.htm>. By comparison, the U.S.
Senate Judiciary Committee reported that 66 seats were vacant as of November 9, 2000. See
U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 106th Congress NominationsStatistics, November
9
2000,
(visited
Feb.
27,
2001)
<http://www.senate.gov/
-judiciary/I06stats.htm>.
15.
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Judicial Conference Seeks New
Judgeships, Press Release, Mar. 16,
1999 (visited June
1, 2000)
<http://www.uscourts.gov/PressReleases/jcc99.html>. The article reports:
At its biannual meeting today, the Conference also agreed to transmit to
Congress a request for an additional seven permanent and four
temporary judgeships in the courts of appeals and 33 permanent and 25
temporary district judgeships. The Conference also will ask Congress to
convert 10 existing temporary judgeships to permanent positions in the
district courts. New judgeships were last created in 1990. Since then,
appeals filings have climbed by more than 30 percent and the number of
cases filed in the district courts has increased by more than 20 percent.
16.
John M. de Figueiredo et al., Congress and the PoliticalExpansion of the
U.S. District Courts, 2 AM. L. & ECON. REv. 107, 122 (2000) (finding that "there is a 39
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the incoming president's potential impact on the judiciary as significant enough to
use it as a rallying point during the 2000 presidential campaign.'
George W. Bush, like his predecessors, will seek to name judges who
will carry his policy views to the courts; that is, the president will want to "fix" the
courts." He will want to avoid Dwight Eisenhower's error when asked if he had
made any mistakes while in office, Eisenhower reportedly responded, "Two-and
they both sit on the Supreme Court.'" 9 The new president and his advisors should
look to the empirical work of social scientists if they want to make the "right"
decision in picking judges who match the president's perspective. A great deal of
social science research has been conducted on the factors influencing judges'
decisions, producing robust, informative findings. Current studies reveal the
percentage point higher probability of an expansion in the district court during times of
unified government than during times of divided government"); John M. DeFiguciredo &
Emerson H. Tiller, Congressional Control of the Courts: A Theoretical and Empirical
Analysis of Expansion of the FederalJudiciary, 39 J.L. & ECON. 435, 444-45, 452 (1996)
(testing the theory that the House majority would support the creation of new courts of
appeals judgeships when the new appointments would be nominated by a president from the
same party and confirmed by a Senate majority from the same party and finding that a
unified federal government is 59 percent more likely to add circuit judges than a divided
government).
17.
See, e.g., Christian Coalition, A Mfessage from the President: Letter
Regarding the
Countdown
to
Victory
(visited
June
20,
2000)
<http://wwwv.cc.orgfcountdownletter.html> ("alerting concerned Christians" that the 2000
election will impact the appointment of three Supreme Court justices and 180 federal
judges); Letter from Kate Michelman, NARAL President, to NARAL Supporters (2000)
(on file with Author) (warning supporters that an anti-choice president could use judicial
appointment to limit abortion rights); NARAL Web Page, The Powers of the President:
Reproductive Freedom
and
Choice (visited
on
June
16,
2000)
<http://www.naral.orgmediaresourcespublicationstpresidentindex.html> (cautioning that
a new president will have the power to nominate judges to federal appellate courts);
Barbara Olson, Will the Supreme Court Remain Supreme?, RISING TIDE, Winter 2000, at 10
(warning readers of this Republican National Committee publication that a liberal president
could fill the courts with left-wing jurists who would radically alter national policies). Cf.
High-Court Nominee Issue May Sway Voters, Poll Finds, DALLAS MORNING NEws, July 2,
2000, at A24 (describing results of Princeton Survey Research Associates poll of registered
voters: nearly three-quarters indicated that a candidate's probable Supreme Court
appointments would be important to their vote with 36% stating appointments would be
very important and 37% stating they would be somewhat important (with a 4 percentage
point margin of error)).
18.
Cf.Montgomery N. Kosma, Measuring the Influence of Supreme Court
Justices, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 333, 336 (1998) (drawing an analogy between "a financial
manager selecting a capital investment' and "a president choosing a Supreme Court
nominee" and developing "an economic model of the nominee as an investment").
19.
Eisenhower was reportedly referring to Chief Justice Earl Warren and Justice
William Brennan. See HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS: A POLITICAL
HISTORY OF APPOINTMENTS TO THE SUPRB E COURT 266 (3d ed. 1992). Though repeated in
many places, there is no direct evidence that Eisenhower actually uttered those words. Yet,
this probably apocryphal tale seems consistent with Eisenhower's views on Warren's and
Brennan's liberal Court decisions.
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significance of a judge's political preferences and the insignificance of personal
attributes such as gender, race, age, and religion. In addition, career experience
appears to be weakly correlated with judicial decisions on certain subjects.
This Article critically examines the existing social science evidence on
the relative importance of various individual factors on judicial behavior and adds
to that evidence by considering the influence of prior academic experience on
judges. Researchers have not focused much attention on the importance of a
judge's background as a full-time law professor and legal scholar, although more
than thirteen percent of courts of appeals appointees were former law professors."
Franklin Roosevelt and Ronald Reagan both viewed the federal judiciary
(particularly the Supreme Court and the Courts of Appeals) as integral to their
policy agendas, and both further believed that the individuals best able to fulfill
their policy goals were law faculty who had demonstrated intellectual support for
the president's perspective.2' This Article will demonstrate FDR's and Reagan's
appointments of academics substantially contributed to their ultimate success in
fixing the courts to adopt their respective-and sharply contrasting-perspectives
on law. By selecting legal scholars, the presidents were certain as to the

ideological positions or "preferences" of their nominees. Moreover, former law
professors selected by such means are more likely than other judges to pursue
single-mindedly their views and to seek to influence other judges and courts to
adopt these perspectives.
This Article pays particular attention to judges on U.S. Courts of Appeals
of general jurisdiction. Franklin Roosevelt was the first president to recognize the
potential importance of the circuit courts to his programs and to take an active role
in the selection of lower court judges.' Today, a president will, and should, focus
a great deal of attention on the individuals appointed to the courts of appeals.
These courts are of critical importance, because they make and interpret the law
for their respective regions with little review by the Supreme Court.23 The
20.

See generally Tracey E. George, From the Classroom to the Courtroom:

Academics on the Appeals Courts (2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Author)
(detailing the history of the appointment of legal scholars to serve on federal courts of
appeals)..

21.

See id. at 3-7, 13-17.

22.

See

SHELDON

GOLDMAN,

PICKING

FEDERAL

JUDGES:

LOWER

COURT

SELECTION FROM ROOSEVELT THROUGH REAGAN 30-38 (1997). Goldman explains that when

FDR took office in 1933, the federal judiciary was not perceived as important to the
construction of policies:
But beginning about one to two years after the start of Roosevelt's
presidency, lower-court decisions (and then Supreme Court decisions)
struck down various actions and programs of the New Deal. More than
one-third of the lower-court federal judiciary during 1935 and 1936
issued a total of about sixteen hundred injunctions to prevent the
enforcement of various New Deal measures.
Id at 30-31.
23.
In the October 1999 term, the Supreme Court decided only 79 cases on the

merits in 74 signed opinions. Fewer than four percent of the parties who sought a definitive
ruling from the Court were able to obtain it (and relatively few even tried). See Supreme
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sometimes controversial Ninth Circuit, for example, decides more than 9000
disputes each year with only a handful reconsidered by the Court, leaving in place

the circuit's key rulings in such crucial areas as criminal law, intellectual property,
and immigration rights.'
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I examines systematically the
relative influence of personal attributes, social background, and ideological
perspectives on judicial decision-making. Part II builds a theoretical model of how
the academic experience could create an "individualistic" judge, one who is more
active and independent than her colleagues. Part III tests empirically the
hypotheses that are part of this model. The Article concludes by reflecting on the
implications of the results.
I. UNDERSTANDING JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR
In order to make wise selections, a president and his administration need
to understand the factors influencing judicial behavior, what observable
characteristics of an individual are likely to lead to (or at least be correlated with)
the decisions the individual would make if appointed? Studies of judicial behavior
over the last half century have revealed a great deal about the relative importance
of various factors to judges' decisions. Researchers have considered the influence
of judges' personal attributes, social background, and policy preferences on their
decisional behavior as set forth in table I.

Court of the United States, 2000 Year-End Report on the FederalJudiciary(visited Feb. 27,
2001)
<http:llwv.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfolyear-cnd2OOOyear-endreport.html>.
During the previous term, the U.S. Courts of Appeals decided 26,727 cases on the merits.
See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED
STATES COURTS: 1999 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR tbl.B-I (1999), available at
<http//wvww.uscourts.govjudbusl999/bOlsep99.pdf> (setting forth details of the circuit
caseload for the 1998-99 term and reporting that courts of appeals terminated 24,710
additional cases without reaching the merits).
24.
See Howard Mintz, Judicial Choices Crucialfor West, SAN JOSE MERCURY
NEWs, July 9, 2000, available at <httpJ/vww.mercurycenter.com/premium
/nation/docs/fedjudges09.htm> (arguing that the next president would have a profound
effect on the West through his appointments to the Ninth Circuit, because the Ninth Circuit
has a greater impact on the region than does the Supreme Court).
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Table 1. Individual Factors and Judicial Behavior: Existing Empirical
Studies
Personal Attributes

Age
Gender
i Race
_Religion

Social Background

Education
Prior Judicial Experience
Prior Prosecutorial Experience
Prior Public/Elected Office

Policy Preferences

ILegal Doctrine
i Appointing President
Party Affiliation

A. PersonalAttributes
The most obvious characteristics of potential nominees are their age,
gender, race, and religion. As human behavior is often linked to these individual
traits, judicial behavior may be as well. Studies of federal and state courts at every
level have examined the relationship between judges' personal attributes and their
voting behavior. Here, I bring together these disparate works and evaluate what
they tell us about judicial decision-making.
1.Age
Judges of different ages offer complementary practical benefits to a
president: the benefit of appointing younger judges is the prospect of longer
tenure, whereas the benefit of appointing older judges is greater information about
"their legal views. Does judicial age also result in substantive differences? Scholars
have hypothesized that individuals become more conservative over time, and
hence older judges would be more conservative than younger judges. 5 Sheldon

25.
A small number of studies have also considered the effect of age at the time
of appointment as opposed to the effect of age at the time of decision. A judge's age at
appointment may measure the relative influence of the court's socialization processes on
the judge, since a younger judge may be more open to its influences. See, e.g., S. Sidney
Ulmer, Social Background as an Indicator to the Votes of Supreme Court Justices in
Criminal Cases: 1947-1956 Terms, 17 AM. J. POL. Sci. 622, 625 (1973) (finding, in a study
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Goldman, in an early and influential study of courts of appeals decisions, found
that older judges were more conservative than younger judges; however, his study
did not control for party identification. 6 In contrast, an earlier Goldman study
discovered no relationship between age and circuit judges' votes (except for votes
on labor issues) when party affiliation was held constant Goldman questioned
his earlier finding based on its reliance on a categorical rather than a continuous
age variable; however, his later study is limited by its failure to control for
political party identification Controlling for judges' party affiliation is important
because age will be roughly correlated with party identification (i.e., judges of the
same approximate age were likely appointed by the same president and hence aill
probably be from the same party) and party identification is a strong predictor of
judicial votes. Therefore, any observed relationship between age and votes when
party is not held constant may merely be the result of the influence of party on
votes. In a Supreme Court study, Neal Tate found that age, measured in years (a
continuous variable) and in cohorts (a categorical variable), was not a meaningful
explanation of justices' votes when the influence of party affiliation and other
judicial characteristics was controlled On balance, the studies suggest that age is
how judges will vote, particularly once other
of minimal value in predicting
3
variables are considered
of 14 Supreme Court justices, that age at appointment was highly correlated with the
support of government parties).
26.
Sheldon Goldman, Voting Behavior on the United States Courts of Appeals
Revisited, 69 AM. POL.Sci. REv. 491,499 & tbl.6, 500-501, 501 tbl.7 (1975) (also finding
no age difference in rate of dissent).
27.
Sheldon Goldman, Voting Behavior on the United States Courts ofAppeals.
1961-64, 60 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 374 (1966); see also James J. Brudney et al., Judicial
Hostility Toward Labor Unions? Applying the Social Background Model to a Celebrated
Concern, 60 OHIO ST. LJ. 1675, 1715 tbl.II (1999) (reporting that age and union support
were negatively related, but the influence of age appears minimal and the finding is only
significant at the .10 level); Charles M. Lamb, Exploring the Conservatism of Federal
Appeals Court Judges, 51 IND. L.J.257, 267-70, 277 (1975) (finding that some District of
Columbia circuit judges voted more conservatively over time while others became slightly
more liberal).
28.
See Goldman, supra note 26, at 498.
29.
C. Neal Tate, PersonalAttribute Models of the Voting Behavior of U.S.
Supreme Court Justices: Liberalism in Civil Liberties and Economics Decisions, 1946-1978,75 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 355, 359-63 (1981).
For examples of district court studies, see Orley Ashenfelter et al., Politics
30.
and the Judiciary: The Influence ofJudicialBackground on Case Outcomes, 24 J. LEGAL
STUD. 257 (1995) (concluding, based on a statistical analysis of 2258 district court cases,
that a judge's age did not influence the probability of settlement); Beverly Blair Cook,
Sentencing Behavior of FederalJudges: Draft Cases-1972, 42 U. CIN. L. REV.597, 62324 (1973) (discerning no relationship between a judge's age (over or under 65) and the
severity of sentences given to draft offenders); Herbert M. Kritzer, PoliticalCorrelatesof
the Behavior of FederalDistrict Judges: A "Best Case" Analysis, 40 J.POL. 25, 49-50
(1978) (finding a positive relationship between a judge's age and the harshness of the
punishment imposed on draft lav violators); Gregory C. Sisk et al., Chartingthe Influences
on the JudicialMind: An EmpiricalStudy ofJudicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377,
1459-60 (1998) (finding, after controlling for other variables, that a district judge's age was
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In addition to marginal evidence of a relationship between a judge's age
and her decisions, judicial age theories suffer from methodological
shortcomings.?3' As James Gibson explains: "Age.. .is a particularly troublesome
variable because it is so difficult to disentangle the variety of effects (including
generational effects, effects of socialization to the judicial position, and period
'
In the end, a president should consider a
effects) with which it is associated."32
length
of tenure or about having sufficient
judge's age if concerned about
information on jurisprudential positions, but not as an. indicator of probable
rulings.
2. Gender and Race
Presidents have appointed lawyers of varying ages to the circuit courts,
but of nearly unvarying gender and race: most appointees have been white men.
Franklin Roosevelt appointed the first woman to the courts of appeals in 1934,33
LBJ was the only other president to name a female circuit judge (and he named
only one)3 4 before Jimmy Carter appointed eleven women to the courts of appeals
not a significant factor in her decision on the constitutionality of the Sentencing Guidelines
or in the reasoning upon which she based her decision). But see Theodore Eisenberg &
Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Effects ofIntent: Do We Know How Legal Standards Work?, 76
CORNELL L. REV. 1151, 1189-90 tbl.4 (1991) (reporting that judicial age was statistically
significantly related to rulings on intent claims in race discrimination suits).
31.
One of the criticisms ofjudicial age research is that any observed differences
in judicial behavior may be attributable to the judge's tenure on the court, since older
judges have frequently also been on the court longer than younger judges. Thus, any
attribution of voting variations to judicial age would be spurious. Interestingly, studies of
the effects of length of tenure have not found it to be significantly related to judges'
decisions. See, e.g., Brudney et al., supra note 27, at 1730 tbl.VI (reporting an extremely
weak, negative relationship-that approached but did not attain statistical significancebetween year appointed and decisions in support of labor unions).
32.
James L. Gibson, From Simplicity to Complexity: The Development of
Theory in the Study of JudicialBehavior, 5 POL. BEHAV. 7, 24 (1983); see also David J.
Danelski, The Supreme Court of Japan:An Exploratory Study, in COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL
BEHAVIOR: STUDIES OF POLITICAL DECISION-MAKING IN THE EAST AND WEST 121, 149
(Glendon Schubert & David J. Danelski eds., 1969) (arguing that an individual's
chronological age does not produce "liberalism, but.. .liberalism and conservatism are
related to the climate of political opinion prevailing during the critical periods of the
justices' political socialization"); Kritzer, supra note 30, at 50 (concluding, based on other
correlations, that the positive relationship between age and sentence severity was a product

of the effect of appointing president on behavior).

33.

Florence Ellinwood Allen served on the Sixth Circuit from 1934 through

1959, presiding as chief judge in 1958 and 1959, and continued in senior status until her
death in 1966. See Federal Judicial Center, Judges of the United States Courts, supra note
1. For biographical information, see generally JEANETrE E. TuvE, FIRST LADY OF THE LAW :
FLORENCE ELLINWOOD ALLEN (1984); Sarah Wilson, Florence Ellinwood Allen, in WOMEN
IN LAw: A BIO-BIBLIOGRAPHICAL SOURCEBOOK 17 (Rebecca Mae Salokar & Mary L.
Volcansek eds., 1996).
LBJ appointed Shirley Hufstedler to the Ninth Circuit in 1968. She resigned
34.
in 1979 to join the Carter cabinet as Secretary of Education. See Federal Judicial Center,
Judges ofthe United States Courts,supra note 1.
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(approximately twenty percent of his circuit appointments) beginning in 1977."5 A
chasm also spread between Harry Truman's recess appointment of the first
African American to the courts of appeals36 and the appointment of a measurable
number of racial minorities: only four African Americans and one Asian American
took circuit posts between 1950 and 1977, and no Hispanic or Native American
did so.Y Jimmy Carter's efforts to diversify the federal bench resulted in the
appointment of two Hispanics, one Asian American, and nine African Americans

to the courts of appeals (representing twenty-one percent of his circuit

appointments).38 Given the relative lack of variability in the gender and race of
federal judges, meaningful empirical study of the influence of these attributes on
judicial behavior was not possible until Carter's nominees had been in office long

enough to issue a sufficient number of opinions for consideration. Moreover,

robust analysis was stayed until Clinton's additional appointments increased the
number of nontraditional judges (Reagan and Bush having appointed an almost
entirely white-male circuit bench).,9

35.
See id.
36.
William Henry Hastie served on the Third Circuit from 1949 through 1971,
presiding as chief judge from 1968 through 1971, and continued in senior status until his
death in 1976. See id. He was the Dean of Howard University School of Law from 1939
until 1946 and was first appointed to federal judicial office by FDR, who named him to the
district court in the Virgin Islands. See id. For biographical information, see PHILLIP
McGUIRE, HE, TOO, SPOKE FOR DaiocRAcY: JUDGE HASTIE, WORLD VAR II, AND THE
BLACK SOLDIER (1988); GILBERTNVARE, WILLIAM HASTIE: GRAcE UNDER PREssURE (1984).
37.
See Federal Judicial Center, Judges of the United States Courts, supra note
1; see also Beverly Blair Cook, Black Representation in the Third Branch, 1 BLACK LJ.
260, 260-61, 264-65, 267 (1971) (observing the slow integration of American courts (one
percent of all judges were black in 1970, the same percentage as in 1963, while by
comparison, eleven percent of Americans were black in 1970), finding that black judges sat
on federal courts in states with black state judges, and concluding that the low number of
black lawyers did not account entirely for the scarcity of black judges); The Black Judge in
America: A StatisticalProfile, 57 JUDICATURE 18, 18 (1973) (reporting that in 1973 blacks
constituted twelve percent of the American population, 1.2% of lawyers, 1.2% of state and
city judges, and seven percent of full-time federal judges).
38.
One of Carter's appointments was a minority woman: Second Circuit Judge
Amalya Kearse, who is black. See Federal Judicial Center, Judges of the United States
Courts,supra note 1.
39.
Reagan named 4 women (5% of his appointments), 1 African American and
1 Latino to the courts of appeals of general jurisdiction. Bush named 7 women (19%), 1
African American and 2 Latinos to the courts of appeals. As of November 24, 2000, Clinton
had named 20 women (31%), 10 African Americans, 9 Hispanics, 1 Asian American, and 1
Native American to the courts of appeals (32% of Clinton's appointments were ethnic
minorities). Id.; Alliance for Justice, JudicialSelection ProjectAnnual Report 1999 (visited
Feb. 27, 2001) <http:llwww.afj.orgljspltables.html""tl> (includes confirmed nominees who

have not yet received their commissions); see also Carl Tobias, Leaving a Legacy on the
Federal Courts, 53 U. Mtmii L. Rv. 315, 318-20, 325-29 (1999) (reviewing Clinton's
efforts to nominate women and minorities to the federal courts, recommending the
appointment of more women and minorities, and contending that "[t]he selection of so few
women and minorities by President Reagan and President Bush is troubling because they
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Prior to much empirical study, scholars hypothesized that women jurists
would adjudicate in a "different voice": female judges would be more sympathetic
to claims of discrimination and exclusion and more likely to favor community
concerns and family preservation." If women judges approach judging from a
distinct perspective, then we should observe differences in the judicial decisions of
men and women. Empirical studies, however, have failed to find any broad,
gender-based behavioral distinctions between jurists.4 The one exception may be
had bigger, more experienced pools of female and minority attorneys from whom to choose
than did President Carter").
40.
See, e.g., Kenneth L. Karst, Woman's Constitution, 1984 DUKE L.J. 447

(1984) (asserting that women judges would integrate women's values-caring, connection,
and community-into their constitutional decisions); Herbert M. Kritzer & Thomas M,
Uhlman, Sisterhood in the Courtroom: Sex of Judge and Defendant in Criminal
Disposition, Soc. Sci. J., April 1997, at 77 (anticipating that differences in "the
socialization experiences of men and women" would lead to differences in the judicial
decisions of men and women); Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in
ConstitutionalAdjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543 (1986) [hereinafter Sherry, Civic Virtue]
(arguing, based in part on Carol Gilligan's "different voice" theory, that women judges
would pursue a feminine jurisprudence favoring individual claims of exclusion from the
community but valuing community interests over individual rights); Suzanna Sherry, The
Gender ofJudges, 4 LAW & INEQ. J. 159, 161 (1986) (predicting "that an influx of women
into the judiciary will result in a corresponding decrease in gender-biased decision
making"); Carl Tobias, Closing the Gender Gap on the Federal Courts, 61 U. CIN. L. REV.
1237, 1243 (1993) (arguing that "numerous female judges could beneficially affect
substantive decision-making, especially in areas such as discrimination"); see generally
CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S
DEVELOPMENT (1982).

41.
For an analysis of the relationship between state supreme court judges'
gender and their decisions, see Donald R. Songer & Kelley A. Crews-Meyer, Does Judge
Gender Matter?Decision Making in State Supreme Courts, 81 SOC. SCI. Q. 750 (2000). But
see David W. Allen & Diane E. Wall, The Behavior of Women State Supreme Court
Justices: Are They Tokens or Outsiders? 12 JusT. SYs. J. 232 (1987) (examining the
behavior of five female state supreme court judges and identifying four of the five as much
more liberal than their male counterparts). For studies concluding that no meaningful
gender differences existed in trial judges' sentencing and conviction decisions, see John
Gruhl et al., Women As Policymakers: The Case of Trial Judges, 25 AM. J.POL. Sl.308,
308 (1981) (concluding, based on an analysis of a northeastern city's criminal courts, that
"women judges generally did not convict and sentence defendants differently than men
judges did," except that women were more likely than men to sentence female defendants
to prison time); Kritzer & Uhlman, supra note 40, at 82 (discovering that male and female
judges treated criminal defendants similarly). For articles examining the content of women
judges' opinions for a "different voice," see Jilda M. Aliotta, Justice O'Connor and the
Equal Protection Clause: A Feminine Voice?, 78 JUDICATURE 232 (1995) (concluding,
based on an empirical examination of O'Connor's opinions, that O'Connor's decisions
could be explained by her political party affiliation rather than her gender); Sue Davis, Do
Women Judges Speak "In a Different Voice? ": Carol Gilligan, FeministLegal Theory, and
the Ninth Circuit, 8 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 143 (1992) (examining the content of Ninth Circuit
Equal Protection opinions for differences based on gender and finding insufficient support
for the "different voice" theory as applied to appellate judges). But see Sherry, Civic Virtue,
supra note 40 (arguing that O'Connor's legal reasoning reflected a distinctly feminine
perspective). See generally Michael E. Solimine & Susan E. Wheatley, Rethinking Feminist
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sex discrimination cases, where female judges simply may be better able to
identify with plaintiffs. Two courts of appeals studies have found that women
circuit judges were slightly more receptive to employment-discrimination suits
claiming gender bias than were their white male colleagues.4 Federal district court
studies have repeatedly failed to find a gender effect in any issue area, including
sex discrimination.43 Thus, while feminist and feminine theories of judging
abound,' female judges do not appear to adopt significantly different approaches

Judging,70 IND. L.J. 891 (1995) (challenging the feminist theory ofjudging as espoused by
Sherry).
See Nancy E. Crowe, The Effects of Judges' Sex and Race on Judicial
42.
Decision Making on the United States Courts ofAppeals, 1981-1996 (1999) (unpublished
Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Chicago, on file with Author) (concluding, after a
systematic consideration of courts of appeals decisions from 1981 through 1996, that
female judges were more likely than male judges to vote in favor of plaintiffs in
employment discrimination cases claiming gender bias but not in cases claiming race bias);
Sue Davis et al., Voting Behavior and Gender on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 77
JUDICATURE 129 (1993) (finding that (I) Democratic women appointed to the courts of
appeals voted in favor of employees in employment discrimination cases more often than
Democratic men, but that Republican women and men were indistinguishable, and (2) male
and female judges did not vote statistically significantly different in obscenity cases
although Republicans and Democrats did); Donald R. Songer et al., A Reappraisalof
Diversificationin the Federal Courts: Gender Effects in the Courts ofAppeals, 56 J. PoL.
425, 436 (1994) (finding that circuit judge gender had a statistically significant-though
relatively weak-impact on job discrimination decisions); see also Brudney et al., supra
note 27, at 1756-59 (discovering that Republican women circuit judges were more likely
than Republican men to support the union's position in unfair labor practices suits, but that
Democratic men and women were indistinguishable). But see Gerald S. Gryski et al.,
Models ofState High CourtDecision Making in Sex Discrimination Cases,48 J. PoL 143
(1986) (failing to find a significant relationship between a state high court judge's gender
and decisions in sex discrimination suits).
43.
See. e.g., Ashenfelter et al., supra note 30 (failing to find any relationship
between a district judge's gender and the likelihood of case settlement); Jennifer Segal,
Representative Decision Making on the Federal Bench: Clinton's District Court
Appointees, 53 PoL. RES. Q. 137 (2000) (concluding, based on an examination of district
court decisions, that women appointed by Clinton to the district courts were neither more
responsive to claims of disadvantaged groups nor more liberal or activist than Clinton's
white male appointees); Sisk et al., supra note 30, at 1453-54 (finding, after controlling for
other variables, that a district judge's sex was not a significant factor in her decision on the
constitutionality of the Sentencing Guidelines or in the reasoning upon which she based her
decision); Thomas G. Walker & Deborah J. Barrow, The Diversification of the Federal
Bench: Policy and Process Ramifications, 47 J. POL. 596 (1985) (analyzing male and
female district judge's decisions across issue areas and discovering significant differences
in only two areas-personal liberties and minority policy issues-and the direction of the
difference was opposite of the one expected-male judges were more likely to support
claimants than female judges).
44.

See, e.g., SANDRA BERNs, To SPEAK AS A JUDGE: DIFFERENCE, VOICE, AND

POWER (1999); Judith Resnick, On the Bias: Feminist Reconsiderationsof the Aspirations
for OurJudges, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 1877 (1988); Sherry, Civic Virtue, supra note 40.
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to judging from those taken by their male colleagues, 45 a result consistent with
analyses of other political elites.46
Scholars have also hypothesized that ethnic minorities, particularly
African Americans, would vote distinctively on the bench, privileging the rights of
the accused and disadvantaged groups. 47 The expectation that black judges are
more liberal than white judges appears to be held by politicians as reflected in the
difficulties faced by black lawyers aspiring to judicial posts. 48 Nominees of color
45.
See generally Beverly Blair Cook, Will Women JudgesMake a Difference in
Women's Legal Rights? A PredictionFrom Attitudes and Simulated Behavior, in WOMEN,
POWER, AND POLITICAL SYSTEMS 216 (Margherita Rendel ed., 1981) (reporting few gender
differences in jurists' attitudes and thus predicting little to distinguish female from male
judicial behavior). But see Elaine Martin, Men and Women on the Bench: Vive La
Difference?, 73 JUDICATURE 204 (1990) (analyzing mail survey responses showing that
women judges had different perspectives and experiences than their male colleagues and
arguing that women judges would therefore adjudicate differently).
46.
See, e.g., Frieda Gehlen, Women Members of Congress: A Distinctive Role,
in A PORTRAIT OF MARGINALITY: THE POLITICAL BEHAVIOUR OF THE AMERICAN WOMAN
(Marianne Githens & Jewel Prestage eds., 1977) (finding female Congressional
representatives deviated little from the behavior of male representatives); Edmund
Costantini & Kenneth Craik, Women as Politicians:The Social Background, Personality,
and PoliticalCareers ofFemale PartyLeaders, 28 J. Soc. ISSUES 217 (1972) (reporting no
significant gender differences among political party elites). But see Shelah G. Leader, The
Policy Impact of Elected Women Officials, in THE IMPACT OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS
(Joseph Cooper & Louis Maisels eds., 1977) (concluding based on interest group ratings
that female members of Congress were more likely to cast liberal votes than men,
particularly on social welfare and defense spending matters); Sue Thomas, The Impact of

Women on State Legislative Policies, 53 J. POL. 958 (1991) (reporting that women
legislators in state legislatures with a high percentage female membership propose and
support more bills benefitting women, children, and families than men generally or women
in low-percentage female legislatures); Susan Welch, Are Women More Liberal Than Men
in the U.S. Congress?, 10 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 125 (1985) (finding that, according to interest
group ratings, women were more liberal than men, though the difference has decreased over
time); see generally WOMEN AND ELECTIVE OFFICE: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE (Sue
Thomas & Clyde Wilcox eds., 1998).
47.
See MICHAEL DAVID SMITH, RACE VERSUS THE ROBE: THE DILEMMA OF
BLACK JUDGES 256 (1983) (contending that black judges are more sympathetic to criminal
defendants); George W. Crockett, Jr., The Role of the Black Judge, 20 J. PUB. L. 391 (1970)
(arguing that black judges can reduce racist decision-making in the courts); Sheldon
Goldman, Should There Be Affirmative Action for the Judiciary?, 62 JUDICATURE 488, 494
(1979) (arguing that minority judges will inevitably bring "a certain sensitivity-indeed,
certain qualities of the heart and mind-that may be particularly helpful in dealing with
[issues of racial and sexual discrimination]").
48.
See Cook, supra note 37, at 270 (concluding based, on her study of black
judicial appointments, that "[t]he white monopoly in the Fourth and Fifth Circuits is
probably due to the linking of ethnic and policy consequences to black appointments").
North Carolina Senator Jesse Helms, a senior Republican, has been in the unprecedented
position of arguing that his state should not have a judge on the circuit court, despite the
fact that two Fourth Circuit judgeships were vacated by North Carolinians in the 1990s. See
James Rosen, Helms Raises Ire with Court Bill, RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER, Mar. 28,
1999, at Al. Helms effectively blocked the two North Carolina nominees that Clinton had
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are twice as likely as whites not to be confirmed. 49 The most recent, high-profile
example is the Senate rejection of Ronnie White, the first African American judge
on Missouri's highest court, who was nominated by Clinton for the Eastern
District of Missouri court. Senators expressed concern that White was too soft on
capital crimes, or as Missouri Senator John Ashcroft put it, Judge White has "a
tremendous bent toward criminal activity.""0 White was the first nominee to be
rejected by the full Senate since the Bork nomination.5 Some observers concluded
that the Senators acted on the belief that black jurists vote differently from white
judges, or specifically that blacks on the bench would identify with and be lenient
on criminal defendants, rather than on White's voting record. 52 In fact, White
voted to affirm seventy-one percent of the death penalty appeals he heard, and in
all but one of the remaining cases, he agreed with judges appointed by Ashcroft
when he was Missouri Governor.53 White voted consistently with his white
supreme court colleagues in these cases.5
Empirical research has not consistently revealed meaningful and
systematic differences in the voting of black federal judges as compared to their
proposed for these seats: both were African Americans. Debra Baker, raiting and
Wondering, 85 A.B.A.J. 52 (1999). Helms justified his position on the grounds that the
Fourth Circuit does not need the vacancies filled; however, he voted to confirm the
appointment of two other, white Clinton nominees to the Fourth during this period. Alliance
for Justice, Judicial Selection Project Annual Report (visited Feb. 27, 2001)
<http://www.af.orgjsp/jsp99.html#III-a3>. The Fourth Circuit has the largest population of
African Americans but had never had an African American judge. Bill Rankin, President's
Speech: Clinton Blasts Gridlock on Judge Nominees, ATLANTA COSLT., Aug. 10, 1999, at

A10 (recounting Clinton's keynote address at the 1999 American Bar Association's Annual
meeting). During the last congressional recess, Clinton appointed Roger Gregory, a black
Virginian, to a one-year seat on the Fourth Circuit, which will become permanent if
Gregory is confirmed by the Senate. See Eggen, supra note 1.
49.
See Task Force on Federal Judicial Selection supra note 12, at 18 tl.15, 69
fig.15 (including among failed nominations those for which the Senate failed to take action
and those that were withdrawn); cf Baker, supra note 48, at 53 (reporting that 63.4% of
black lawyers, as compared to 11.5% of white lawyers, believe race is the major reason the
Senate Judiciary Committee has not acted on minority nominees).
50.
The Ronnie White Vote, WASH. POST, Oct. 8, 1999, at A28.
51.
See Donna Britt, Judginga Nominee by the Color ofHis Skin?, WASH. POST,
Oct. 8, 1999, at B1.
52.
See, e.g., id.; Steve Kraske & Kevin Murphy, White HouseRips Rejection of
Nominee, KAN. CrrY STAR, Oct. 7, 1999, at Al (reporting that Clinton administration as

well as leading civil rights groups accused Senate of racism in rejection); Ben White,
Deepening Rift over Judge Vote, Minorities Confirmed at a Lower Rate, IASH. POST, Oct.
7, 1999, at A3 (discussing claims of racism in Senate confirmation process). But see
Benjamin Soskis, On the Hill: White Out, NEv REPUBLiC, Nov. 1, 1999, at 14 (arguing that
"White's rejection wasn't the result of racism but of another potent force: the grimy

imperatives of state-level electoral politices").
53.
See Britt,supra note 51.
54.
See id. Cf Bruce M. Wright, A Black Brood on Black Judges, 57
JUDICATURE 22, 22-23 (1973) (arguing, from his perspective as a black state judge, that
black jurists conform to fit the conservative, white judicial model in order to avoid
controversy and censure and to maintain status).
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white counterparts, though the evidence provides more support for the presence of
racial distinctions than of gender distinctions in judging.55 One appeals court study
discovered that, after controlling for party identification in a multivariate analysis,
African American circuit judges were much more receptive than were white
judges to employment discrimination claims.56 An earlier appeals court stufy,
based on relative frequencies in a smaller sample, detected no racial differences in
employment discrimination decisions, though it did uncover strong differences in
criminal and prisoner's rights cases.57 Federal district court studies of Carter as
well as Clinton judges failed to find demonstrable differences between white and
black jurists in any issue area.5" Studying racial effects on judicial decisionmaking remains challenging due to the small number of minority federal judges.
Further confounding study, most minority judges share characteristics found to
influence judicial behavior, such as party affiliation and the party of their
appointing president (most are Democrats and/or appointed by Democrats),

55.
State court studies are also conflicting. Compare Susan Welch et al., Do
Black Judges Make a Difference?, 32 AM. J. POL. SCI. 126 (1988) (concluding, based on an
analysis of a northeastern city's criminal court, that "[w]hile the impact of black judges
is.. .somewhat mixed, in the crucial decision to incarcerate, having more black judges
increases equality of treatment") with THOMAS UHLMAN, RACIAL JUSTICE: BLACK JUDGES
AND DEFENDANTS IN AN URBAN TRIAL COURT (1979) (concluding, based on an analysis of

an urban criminal court, that black and white judges were both more severe on black
defendants as compared to white ones) and Thomas Uhlman, Black Elite Decision Making:
The Case ofTrial Judges, 22 AM. J. POL Sci. 884 (1978) (reaching same conclusion).
56.
See Crowe, supra note 42, at 84.
57.
See Jon Gottshall, Carter's Judicial Appointments: The Influence of
Affirmative Action and Merit Selection on Voting on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 67
JUDICATURE 165, 172-73 (1983) (analyzing Carter's black male and white male judges'
votes in a sample of 301 non-unanimous criminal and prisoner's rights cases, 169 sex
discrimination cases, and 295 race discrimination cases from 1979-1981 and finding blacks
voted for accused and prisoners 79% of the time compared to 53% for whites, blacks voted
for plaintiffs in sex discrimination suits 65% of the time compared to 57% for whites, and
blacks voted for plaintiffs in race discrimination suits 57% compared to 59% for whites);
see also Brudney et al., supra note 27, at 1715 tbl.II (reporting no relationship between
African American characteristic and votes in support of labor unions in a study of 5463
unfair labor practice appeals); Deborah Jones Merritt & James J. Brudney, Stalking Secret
Law: What PredictsPublicationin the United States Courts of Appeals, 54 VAND. L. REV.
1, 109-10 tbl.X (2001) (finding no relationship between black racial identity and votes in
unpublished, unfair labor practices circuit court decisions).
58.
See Walker & Barrow, supra note 43, at 596 (utilizing a matched-pair
statistical strategy to compare female and black federal judges appointed by the Carter
administration to white, male judges also appointed by Carter); Segal, supra note 43, at
144-47 (examining votes of Clinton-appointed district court judges and discerning no
relationship between race and voting); see also Sisk et al., supra note 30, at 1457-58
(finding that black district judges were no more likely than white judges to rule that the
Sentencing Guidelines were unconstitutional, though black judges who found the
Guidelines unconstitutional were more likely to do so on Due Process grounds).
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making it difficult to disentangle the effect of race from the effect of party
affiliation.59
Given the minimal evidence that judicial voting differences are
attributable to race and gender, a president cannot rely on these attributes as a
means of determining a judge's probable votes in the wide range of cases she will
hear. While these characteristics meaningfully influence a person's life
experiences, these attributes alone do not reveal much about the probable behavior
of an individual making judicial decisions. As Theodore Shaw, Associate Director
and Counsel to the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, put it, "If there's
anything we know, it's that to add more judges to the bench based on their race or
ethnicity and regardless of their judicial philosophy, that's a useless game. '
3. Religion

Religious identification can be viewed as a personal attribute and as a
social background characteristic. A person may identify with (or be identified
with) a particular religion because she was born to a family that held those beliefs,
and hence religious identification is akin to an immutable personal attribute. An
individual speaks of being of Greek Orthodox or Jewish heritage, for example. A
person, though, may choose to change religious affiliation, joining or leaving a
synagogue, church, or mosque. Hence, religious identification is also akin to social
background variables that reflect voluntary experiences. In studies examining the
influence of religion on judges, scholars have based their hypotheses on both the
group identification (i.e., personal attribute) and the socialization (i.e., social
background) effects of religion.
Scholars have hypothesized that judges who are members of minority
religious groups will favor underdogs because minority religion judges will
empathize with the underdog's difficult circumstances. Specifically, studies have
examined whether Catholics and Jews were more receptive than Protestants to
claims of the economically and politically disadvantaged. Catholic courts of
appeals judges in the 1960s were somewhat more likely to favor the "have-nots"
59.

See, e.g., Ashenfelter et al., supra note 30, at 275 (cautioning that their

failure to find any relationship between a judge's ethnicity and case settlement should be
viewed circumspectly, because their "sample contains so few minority and female judges

that findings with respect to these variables should only be viewed as guides to the behavior
of judges in the sample rather than to any larger class of minority and female judges");
Gottschall, supra note 57, at 172 tbl.6 (relying on only 63 votes by black appeals court
judges in criminal cases and 70 votes in discrimination suits to support his conclusions);
Merritt & Brudney, supra note 57, at 109 & n.119, 110 tblX (finding a statistically
significant and negative relationship between Latino or Asian racial identity and votes
favoring unions in unpublished, unfair labor practices circuit court decisions, but warning
that "[tihe significance of our coefficient for Asian and Latino judges should be interpreted
with caution, because very few of those judges appeared in our database").
60.
Carrie Johnson, FinalJudgment: The PresidentHas Been Criticizedby Left
and Right. Maybe He Got the Bench He Wanted-And Deserved, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 6,
2000, at 10 (quoting an interview with Shaw).
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over the "haves". 6' Yet, later published scholarship has repeatedly failed to find a
significant relationship between a judge's religion and her decisions.62
There are several inherent difficulties with constructing a sound model of
the effect of religious identification on judicial behavior. First, the strength of
religious identification varies substantially among individuals such that a simple
binary classification (e.g., Catholic or not) cannot capture the intensity of the
identification and the resulting influence. Second, the perspectives of religious

groups vary over time, such that Catholics in the Fifties and Sixties were more
likely to favor liberal, Democratic positions whereas Catholics today may be more
likely to vote for conservative, Republican causes. So, any hypothesized
relationship between religion and political behavior may be necessarily timebound. Third, and relatedly, the relationship between socioeconomic status and
religion is dynamic. In studies of 1950s state supreme courts and 1960s courts of
appeals rulings, the researchers classified judges who were Methodists as being
from lower-income backgrounds and holding lower-class perspectives on legal
disputes. This premise would no longer be accurate; hence, findings from earlier
eras may not be relevant today. In the end, religion is not a meaningful
explanation for judicial behavior, and cannot be utilized by the president and his
staff as a substitute for an individual's view on legal issues.
61.
Goldman, supra note 27, at 381-82 (finding, in a study of 2066 circuit
decisions, that "Catholics were more prone than Protestants and perhaps Jews to oppose the
position of the government in fiscal cases," even after controlling for party identification.
However, Catholics did not behave distinctively in any other issue areas, and "[n]o
differences in voting behavior were found between lower-status Protestants (such as
Baptists, Lutherans, and Methodists) and higher-status Protestants (including
Congregationalists, Episcopalians, Presbyterians, and Unitarians)"); Goldman, supra note
26, at 498 (hypothesizing that Catholics, as minority religious group members, "may have
been socialized to favor the underdog" and finding, after controlling for party identification,
that Democratic Catholic judges voted "more liberally for the economic underdog" than
Democratic Protestant judges, but no relationship existed between religious identity and
Republican judges' votes); see also Stuart S. Nagel, Multiple Correlation of Judicial
Backgrounds and Decisions, 2 FL. ST. U.L. Rav. 258, 267 tbl.1, 268-69 (1974) (finding
Catholic state supreme court judges in 1955 were more likely than Protestants to favor
criminal defendants and economic underdogs).
62.
See, e.g., Brudney et al., supra note 27, at 1715 tbl.II (discerning no religionbased distinctions between circuit judges' labor law rulings after controlling for other
judicial characteristics); Michael W. Giles & Thomas G. Walker, JudicialPolicy-Making
and Southern School Segregation, 37 J. POL. 917, 929-31 (1975) (finding social
background characteristics such as birthplace, education, party identification, religion, and
prior political office had only a minimal impact on southern federal district judges'
decisions in school desegregation cases); Merritt & Brudney, supra note 57, at 110 tbl.X
(failing to find a statistically significant relationship between circuit judges' religious
identification and their votes in unfair labor practices suits); Tate, supra note 29, at 362-63
(concluding that religious affiliation did not influence Supreme Court justices' decisions
when other explanatory variables were considered); C. Neal Tate & Roger Handberg, Time
Binding and Theory Building in Personal Attribute Model of Supreme Court Voting
Behavior, 1916-88, 35 AM. J. POL. Sci. 460, 473, 474 tbl.I (1991) (concluding that religion
was not related to Supreme Court justices' decisions for the period 1916 through 1988).
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B. SocialBackground

Judges are people. Their current approaches to their positions as well as
their views on subjects governed by law will be influenced by their pre-judicial
experiences.' It can be difficult to predict or measure the effects of the varied
socialization processes or to contend that a certain experience will affect all
individuals in the same way. Most studies of social background effects
hypothesize that a particular characteristic will influence the ideological direction
of judges' decisions. For example, studies have considered whether specific
careers are highly correlated with liberal or conservative votes.
What distinguishes, on a large scale, the backgrounds of judges? Judges
as well as potential judges share meaningful, transformative educational
experiences, namely college and law school matriculation, and consequently they
will be more alike than different when compared to a random cross-section of
Americans. As among lawyers, their alma maters as well as their post-law school
and pre-judgeship employment may serve to distinguish their experiences and
hence their behavior. Researchers have considered, to varying degrees, the impact
of elite education and career socialization on judges.
1. Elite Education
Judges who attended non-elite or low-tuition schools are more likely than
their elite school colleagues to be from a lower socioeconomic class; thus, we
might expect them to be better able to identify with the underdog, the relatively
disadvantaged party. However, the handful of studies documenting some
relationship (typically a weak one) between the relative rank of higher educational
institution attended and judicial votes discloses the opposite. Prestige of college
and law school is weakly but positively correlated with economic liberalism and
receptivity to civil rights and liberties claims in the decisions of judges on the U.S.
Supreme Court and state supreme courts. Social scientists explain this initially
surprising finding by observing that judges from humble backgrounds may be
affected by the "rags-to-riches phenomenon:" the "conservatism of the self-made
man who lacked the initial advantage of a high-prestige education."

See, e.g., Hon. Shirley S. Abrahamson, The Woman Has Robes: Four
63.
Questions, 14 GoLDEN GATE L. REV. 489, 492-94 (1984). In the article, she related her
answers to questions about her likely behavior as a judge:

What does my being a woman specially bring to the bench? It brings me
and my special background. All my life experiences-including being a
My point is that nobody is just a
woman-affect me and influence me ....
woman or a man. Each of us is a person with diverse experiences. Each
of us brings to the bench experiences that affect our view of law and life
and decision-making.
64.
Nagel, supra note 61, at 270 (finding that state supreme court judges who
attended low-tuition law schools were more pro-prosecution than judges who attended hightuition schools).
65.
Tate, supra note 29, at 363 (finding that the prestige of college--though not
law school-was positively related to U.S. Supreme Court justices' economic liberalism).
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Federal court of appeals and district court research, by and large, has
revealed that judges who attended prestigious schools were neither more liberal
nor more conservative than their colleagues,' but such research may not be
looking in the right place for differences. Differences in educational background
may manifest themselves in the content rather than the direction of judicial
decisions. Elite law schools place greater emphasis on theoretical, as opposed to
practical, analysis and on cutting edge jurisprudential ideas, so elite graduates may
be more inclined to adopt novel legal arguments. An extensive study of circuit
judges concluded based on interviews and surveys that judges who attended elite
law schools more frequently described themselves as innovative decisionmakers.67 No empirical review of judges' decisions, though, has borne out these
self-reports.68
2. Careers

Researchers have considered the influence of career socialization
processes on judicial behavior, focusing particularly on experience as a judge on
another court, as a prosecutor, or as a public/elected official. The research
questions are typically phrased as follows: How does the occupation of interest
differ from prior jobs held by other judges? How do those differences translate
into different views on legal disputes? Of course, career experience may be the
cause of certain perspectives or may instead be the result of those perspectives (or
perhaps the perspectives and the experience are reinforcing). For example,
fighting for convictions may lead a prosecutor to hold conservative, law-and-order
views. Or these views may prompt a lawyer to become a prosecutor. Thus, the
finding that judges who were prosecutors are more conservative in criminal cases
does not tell us whether the job experience is the cause. For the purposes of the
social scientist, the causality conundrum is a frustrating one, as any observed
relationship may be spurious. This difficulty is not the concern of the president or
his staff, however, as the results still indicate that they can expect a former
66.
See, e.g., Brudney et al., supra note 27, at 1715 tbl.II (reporting that elite law
school attendance was not statistically significantly related to votes in union cases when
other variables were considered); Giles & Walker, supra note 62, at 930-31 (finding that
educational background had a de minimis effect on district judges' decisions in school
desegregation cases); Goldman, supra note 27, at 382 (discerning no differences between
circuit judges based on the status of undergraduate college or law school attended); Sisk et
al, supra note 30, at 1463-65 (reporting no relationship between elite education and district
court Sentencing Guideline rulings). But see Brudney et al., supra note 27, at 1715 tbl.II
(discovering a statistically significant, negative relationship between a judge's college
selectivity and votes in support of unions, though the magnitude of the effect of college
status on votes appears to be small).
67.

See J. WOODFORD HOWARD, JR., COURTS OF APPEALS IN THE FEDERAL
A STUDY OF THE SECOND, FIFTH, AND DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUITS

JUDICIAL SYSTEM:

167-69, 168 tbl.6.5 (1981).
68.
See, e.g., Sisk et al, supra note 30, at 1464-65 (discovering that district
judges who attended prestigious schools were more likely to adopt practical reasoning to
support their Sentencing Guidelines decisions, but questioning the significance of this result
in light of coding difficulties).
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prosecutor to adopt a tough-on-crime perspective on the bench, for whatever
reason. Therefore, the president should focus instead on the strength of the
evidence in support of the hypothesized relationships between career background
and voting.
Lawyers who served as judges, particularly on the trial bench, acted to
protect the interests of the underprivileged more frequently than did lawyers who
represented private clients. Hence, prior judicial experience may result in greater
receptivity to claims of discrimination, bias, and the like.' On the other hand,
judges bear responsibility for upholding the law; therefore, judicial experience
may make a person more conservative. While a Supreme Court study has been
published lending support to each of these contradictory propositions," most
research backs the conclusion that judicial experience and voting are unrelated?'
Courts of appeals and district court studies have repeatedly failed to find a
significant relationship between a judge's experience on another court and her
subsequent rulings. 2
Prosecutors act to enforce statutes and to maintain the status quo. In
prosecuting criminal cases, a lawyer argues to restrict individual rights and
liberties by defending searches and seizures as well as interrogations against
defense lawyers' attacks, and by advocating incarceration. A former-prosecutor
judge will likely be more receptive than other judges to government claims in
criminal cases. The former prosecutor's pro-government perspective may extend
to civil rights and liberties cases as well. For example, a former prosecutor who
tried political protestors is less likely to oppose limitations on public

dlemonstrations, and a former prosecutor who ordered wiretapping is unlikely to

69.
See Tate & Handberg, supra note 62, at 470 ("[JJudicial experience will
make attorneys more liberal, since the judge, unlike the attorney, must always fairly weigh
both sides of a dispute, even if one side is that of a socially less privileged litigant.").
70.
Compare Tate, supra note 29, at 362 (finding, in a study of Supreme Court
decisions from 1946 through 1977, that justices who had served on another court were more
receptive to civil rights and liberties claims regardless of their party identification, other
experiences, or personal attributes) with Richard E. Johnston, Supreme Court Voting
Behavior: A Comparison of the Warren and Burger Courts, in CASES INAMERICAN
POLTCs 71 (Robert L. Peabody ed., 1976) (observing a correlation between a Justice's
prior federal judicial experience and conservative civil liberties and economics rulings).
71.
See Tate & Handberg, supra note 62, at 474-76 (concluding, in a study of
Supreme Court decisions from 1916 through 1988, that prior judicial experience was not
related to civil rights and liberties decisions and only very weakly related to economic
rulings).
72.
See, e.g., Ashenfelter et al., supra note 30, at 277-81 (concluding that
district judges' votes appeared unrelated to their judicial background); Brudney et al., supra
note 27, at 1715 tbl.1I (failing to discern a relationship between prior judicial experience
and votes in support of unions in circuit court rulings); Goldman, supra note 26, at 504
(determining that circuit judges with prior judicial experience were no more liberal or
conservative than other judges); Goldman, supra note 27, at 381-82 (finding no relationship
between prior judicial experience and judicial decisions generally or after controlling for
party affiliation).
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oppose electronic surveillance.7' There is evidence that former prosecutors on
supreme courts (federal and state) are more conservative than non-prosecutor
judges in criminal and civil rights and liberties cases.74 The observed effect was
relatively weak, though. Morever, the proposition has generally failed to find
support in studies of lower federal courts.75
Those who seek-and attain-public office have been able to appeal to
the mass electorate. Successful elected officials have worked effectively for the
public and are more likely to be appointed to federal judgeships than unsuccessful
officials. Thus, judges who previously served in public office may be more
sensitive to the claims of common people in economic disputes than colleagues
who spent most of their careers in service to elite, wealthy clients. Studies have
found empirical support for the argument that federal judges with experience as
elected officials behave distinctively, but an equal number have failed to find any
relationship. 6 In the end, then, an individual's prior work as a judge, prosecutor,
73.
Neal Tate has argued that former prosecutors should also be more
economically conservative than other judges: "[P]rosecutors spend most of their time
defending the position of the 'haves' against the criminal attacks of the 'have nots.' Such
experience would logically engender sympathetic attitudes toward economic 'top dogs."'
Tate, supra note 29, at 363; see also Tate & Handberg, supra note 62, at 471 (explaining
that "[s]ince prosecutors defend the public's interest against the miscreants of business and
labor.. .we expect prosecutorial experience to be conservatizing in that issue area also"),
Tate, and later Tate and Handberg, found a statistically significant but extremely weak
relationship between prosecutorial experience and conservative economic Supreme Court
decisions. Nagel found a slight difference between state supreme court judges with and
without prosecutorial experience in economic cases. Nagel, supra note 6 1, at 266-67 tbl. 1,
See, e.g., Johnston, supra note 70, at 108-09 (finding that Justices with
74.
prosecutorial experience were more conservative in criminal procedure cases as well as
economic cases); Nagel, supra note 61, at 266-67 tbl.1 (demonstrating that formerprosecutor judges had an above average prosecution propensity for their respective state
supreme courts, although prosecutorial experience accounted for a small amount (three
percent) of the difference between prosecutors' and non-prosecutors' votes); Stuart S.
Nagel, JudicialBackgrounds and Criminal Cases, 53 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 333, 336

(1962) (reporting similar results); Tate, supra note 29, at 362-63 (showing, after controlling
for various individual attributes, that justices without prosecutorial experience are more
favorable to civil liberties claims than those with prosecutorial experience, though judicial
experience between time as a prosecutor and appointment to the Supreme Court moderates
the prosecutor effect). But see Ulmer, supra note 25, at 628.
75.
For court of appeals studies, see, e.g., Goldman, supra note 26, at 500
(finding, in a study of 2115 circuit cases, that prior prosecutorial experience was not a
significant explanation of judicial decisions in any area, including criminal cases). For
district court studies, see, e.g., Ashenfelter et al., supra note 30; Mark A. Cohen, Explaining
Judicial Behavior, or What's "Unconstitutional" About the Sentencing Guidelines?, 7 J.L.
EcoN. & ORG. 183 (1991); Sisk et al., supra note 30, at 1473-74; but see Eisenberg &
Johnson, supra note 30, at 1189-90 tbl.4 (discerning a significant, though weak,
relationship between prior prosecutorial experience and receptivity to intent arguments in
race discrimination suits).
76.
See, e.g., Brudney et al., supra note 27, at 1715 tbl.II (reporting that former
elected officials on the circuit bench were more likely than their colleagues to support labor
union claims, though the statistical confidence in this result is only 91%); Goldman, supra
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or public official offers limited insight to the individual's probable actions in the
broad range of cases heard by a federal judge.
C Policy Preferences

Judicial decision-makers are at core human decision-makers; thus,
rational choice theory tells us that judges, like human beings generally, will seek
to achieve their goals or preferences. 7 Judicial preferences likely include a desire
to issue opinions that are well thought of by peers, affirmed by higher courts, and
followed by other courts. Hence, judges would seek to issue decisions that are
consistent with widely accepted legal doctrine and stare decisis. Of course, the law
often grants judges a fair degree of discretion to reach more than one conclusion.
And in exercising that discretion, judges will want to issue a decision consistent
with their personal normative conceptions of public policy and rights. Judicial
studies have considered whether judges act to maximize their legal doctrinal goals
("legal theory") and/or their public policy preferences ("attitudinal theory") in
making decisions.

1.LegalDoctrine
The traditional conception ofjudicial decision-making is best captured by
legal theory.79 Legal theory is derived from the idea that judges are neutral and

note 26, at 504 (finding that judges with prior political experience were somewhat less
likely to favor the government in fiscal cases); Tate, supra note 29, at 363 (discovering that
justices who previously held elective office were more liberal on economic questions). But
see Giles & Walker, supra note 62, at 930 (finding prior political office had only a minimal
impact on southern federal district'judges' decisions in school desegregation cases);
Goldman, supra note 27, at 381-82 (finding no relationship between prior public/elective
office or prior judicial experience and judicial decisions generally or after controlling for
party affiliation).
77.

See generally LEE EpsTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE

(1998); Sheldon Goldman, Backgrounds, Attitudes and the Voting Behavior of Judges:A
Comment on Joel Grossman's Social Backgrounds and JudicialDecisions, 31 J. PoL. 214
(1969); Richard Posner, What Do JudgesSeek to Maximize? (The Same Things As Everyone
Else), I Sup. CT. ECON. REv. 1 (1986). No single right theory or unambiguous standard
exists for assigning the rational choice theoretic label. The assumptions generally shared by
rationality theorists are preference or utility maximization, structuring of preferences,
decision-making under conditions of uncertainty, and the centrality of individuals in
explaining collective outcomes. See generally KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND
INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963).

78.
See Task Force on Federal Judicial Selection, supra note 12, at 15 ('In our
postrealist age, we know that legal materials may well be somewhat indeterminate or
conflicting, and that judges often invoke background normative notions in deciding how to
rule.").
79.
See Tracey E. George, Developing a PositiveTheory ofDecision-Making on
U.S. Courts of Appeals, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1635, 1642-43 (1998) (describing the sources and
development of legal theory).
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reasoned arbiters who defer to rules to guide their decisions.8 0 In fact, most judges
believe they are neutral arbiters and go to great lengths to explain their decisions
by reference to existing law. The legal model, which presumes that "the reasons
presented for decisions.. .perform an authentically disciplining function that
constrains judges' decision-making," explains judicial decisions by reference to
the legal rules governing the case."' Scholars have successfully crafted "legal" or
"fact-pattern" models ofjudicial decision-making in several issue areas, including
death penalty,'
obscenity, 3 Fourth Amendment searches," 4 and sex
5
discrimination cases. To the extent that judges' decisions are motivated by
neutral legal principles, presidents cannot influence outcomes through judicial
appointments.
Judges with greater decision-making discretion are less constrained by
legal doctrine. The lower the court in the judicial hierarchy and the fewer the
limits on its caseload, the less discretion the court will have. District courts are the
lowest tier of the federal judicial system and hear the largest number of cases. Not
surprisingly, then, district court studies have found that legal factors account for
most district court rulings, although a small group of close cases are sensitive to
extralegal factors. 6 Since a greater percentage of courts of appeals decisions, and
nearly all Supreme Court cases, allow decision-making leeway, studies
demonstrate that the law provides only a partial account of appellate rulings.
Therefore, presidents can expect to have greater influence on the law through their
appointments to the appellate courts.

80.
See Tracey E. George & Lee Epstein, On the Nature of Supreme Court
Decision Making, 86 AM. POL. Sc. REv. 323, 324, 326 (1992) (explaining the classical
legal paradigm and proposing a decision-making model based on its premises).
81.
Frank B. Cross, PoliticalScience and the New Legal Realism: A Case of
Unfortunate Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 Nw. U. L. Rav. 251, 255-64, 262 (1997)
(delineating traditional legal model of'judicial decision-making and subsequent innovations
in legal theory as found in law schools).
See George & Epstein, supra note 80, at 327-30.
82.
See, e.g., Donald R. Songer & Susan Haire, Integrating Alternative
83.
Approaches to the Study ofJudicial Voting: Obscenity Cases in the U.S. Courts of Appeals,
36 AM. J. POL. Sco. 963 (1992).
84.
See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Segal, Predicting Supreme Court Cases
Probabilistically:The Search and Seizure Cases, 1962-1981, 78 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 891
(1984).
85.
See Jeffrey A. Segal & Cheryl D. Reedy, The Supreme Court and Sex
Discrimination:The Role of the Solicitor General,41 W. POL. Q. 553 (1988).
86.
See ROBERT A. CARP & C.K. ROWLAND, POLICYMAKING AND POLITICS INTHI
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTs 165 (1983) (arguing, based on extensive empirical research, that
for close cases or those presenting new issues, non-legal factors explain district court
outcomes); Ashenfelter et al., supra note 30, at 281 (concluding that in most districtcourt
cases, "[T]he law-not the judge-dominates the outcomes. Judges may treat most cases as
ones in which political interests are irrelevant or cannot change the outcome. In the select
few cases that are appealed or lead to published opinions, individual judges have a greater
role in shaping outcomes."); Sisk et al., supra note 30, at 1465-70.

HeinOnline -- 43 Ariz. L. Rev. 32 2001

20011

COURT FIXING
2. Public Policy:Appointing Presidentand PartyAffiliation

The dominant political science theory of judicial decision-making is the
"attitudinal" model, which posits that judges seek to maximize their sincere public

policy preferences, termed "attitudes."" Because most judges, in contrast to
elected policymakers, have not publicly disclosed their policy preferences, a proxy
for attitudes is necessary. Attitudinal studies have demonstrated that the
ideological direction ("liberal" or "conservative") of the party of a judge's
appointing president is a strong predictor of the case votes of justices on the
Supreme Courts8 and judges on courts of appeal.' Unfortunately for the president
seeking to appoint like-minded judges, however, these studies provide no help. 0
87.
See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATrrruDINAL MODEL (1993) (presenting the best statement and defense of attitudinal
theory); see generally Cross, supra note 81, at 265-311 (describing and critiquing the
attitudinal model); George, supra note 79, 1646-55 (discussing the historical development
and current articulation of the attitudinal model); Gibson, supra note 32, at 9-13
(considering in detail the evolution of an attitudinal model ofjudicial decision-making).
88.
See, e.g., JOHN SPRAGUE, VOTING PATrERNS OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREM4E
COURT. CASES INFEDERALISM 1889-1959 (1968) (examining voting blocs using algorithm
pairing justices who vote together); George & Epstein, supra note 80, at 326, 329-30
(finding that "the addition of Republican appointees enhanced the Court's propensity
toward a law-and-order stance"); Stuart S. Nagel, PoliticalParty Afflialtion and Judges'
Decisions, 55 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 843 (1961); Tate, supra note 30 (demonstrating that the
ideology of the appointing president had a strong influence on justices' decisions in civil
rights and liberties and economic cases).
89.
See, e.g., Brudney et al., supra note 27, at 1715 tbl.lI (finding that
Democratic circuit court appointees were much more likely than Republican appointees to
favor unions); Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, JudicialPartisanshipand Obedienceto
Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155,
2175-76 (1998); George, supra note 79, at 1678-86 (demonstrating that the majority of
Fourth Circuit judges participating in en bane cases between 1962 through 1996 voted their
sincere policy preferences as measured by the party of their appointing president); Jon
Gottschall, Reagan's Appointments to the U.S. Courts of Appeals: The Continuation of a
Judicial Revolution 70 JUDICATURE 48, 54 (1986) (finding that Reagan appointees to the
circuit bench were more conservative than Democratic appointees and comparably
conservative when compared to previous Republican appointees); Stidham et al., supranote
8, at 17, 20 (finding that Clinton appointees were more liberal than Republican appointees
but less than Carter appointees); Richard L. Revesz, EnvironmentalRegulation. Ideology.
and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REv. 1717, 1719 (1997); cf Susan Brodie Haire et al.,
Attorney Expertise, Litigant Success, andJudicial Decision-making in the U.S. Courts of
Appeals, 33 L. & Soc'Y REv. 667, 679-80, 681 tbl.4 (1999) (utilizing an ideological
classification scale where circuit judges "appointed by a conservative ideology-conscious
president [were] coded -1...those appointed by a president who was not ideology conscious
[were] coded 0.. .and those appointed by liberal ideology-conscious presidents [were] coded
+1" and concluding that ideology was significantly related to products liability decisions).
90.
Another successful measure of ideological values analyzes the content of
editorials written about a Supreme Court candidate after presidential nomination and before
Senate confirmation. See Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the
Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 83 AM. POL Sci. REv. 557 (1989); see also Jeffrey
A. Segal et al., Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court JusticesRevisited,
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An individual's party identification would seem another effective proxy
for her policy preferences, particularly when considering her views as contrasted
to a member of a different party.9 1 As Stuart Nagel explains, this hypothesis is
based on the belief that "in some cases judges rely on their personal standards of
value in reaching a decision, and these same personal standards also frequently
account for their party affiliation."'92 So, Democratic judges would be more likely
than Republican judges to cast a liberal vote in cases where they have some
decision-making discretion.' For example, in the areas of civil rights and liberties,
Democratic judges generally seek to extend those freedoms, Republicans to limit
them. In the realm of economic regulation, Democratic jurists favor an enhanced
governmental role in the economy and tend to uphold legislation that benefits
working people or the economic underdog, while Republicans oppose an increase
in government intervention and tend to favor business. In criminal cases,
Democratic judges generally are more sympathetic to criminal defendants, while
Republicans tend to favor prosecution and law enforcement. The categorizations
are admittedly broad and cannot account for the complexity of relative ideological
positions. Nevertheless, the concepts retain meaning and significance in the course
of trying to understand political phenomena.

57 J. POL. 812 (1995) (expanding the Segal and Cover scores to include Bush, Roosevelt,
and Truman appointees). The editorial-content measure is clearly unavailable to presidents
evaluating potential nominees.
91.
But see Gibson, supra note 32, at 36 n.24 (delineating criticisms of the party
proxy).
92.
Nagel, supra note 88, at 847. The author explained the point further by
observing: "[P]arty affiliation and decisional propensity for the liberal or conservative
position correlate with each other because they are frequently effects of the same cause
[and].. .party affiliation may be responsible for some decisional propensity by.. .feedback
reinforcement on his value system which in turn determines his decisional propensities."
93.
For examples of studies utilizing these distinctions between liberal versus
conservative judicial behavior, see DONALD R. SONGER, UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
DATABASE: DOCUMENTATION (ICPSR 1998); HAROLD J. SPAET,
COURT JUDICIAL DATABASE,

1953-1993

UNITED STATES SUPREME

TERMS: DOCUMENTATION

(6th ICPSR version

1995); Nagel, supra note 88, at 845.
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Table 2. Political Party Affiliation of Judicial Appointees
President

Democrats
Appointed

Republicans
Appointed

Other or No
Affiliation

Percentage from
Own Party

FDR

186

5

1

97%

Truman

117

10

0

92%

Eisenhower

10

166

0

94%

JFK

113

11

1

90%

LBJ

160

9

0

95%

Nixon

15

213

0

93%

Ford

13

51

1

78%

Carter

229

13

16

89%

Reagan

14

344

13

93%

Bush

10

166

11

89%

264

15

19

89%

9

Clinton s

Empirical studies have shown that appellate judges' political party
affiliation is consistently correlated with their votes in a way parallel to the
relationship between party and voting in elections and legislatures, though the
magnitude of the difference between judges is typically not as strong as it is
between voters or congressional representatives." Presidents, in fact, look almost
94.
District Court and Court of Appeals appointments drawn from GOLDMAN,
supra note 22, at 277 tbl.7.1; Sheldon Goldman & Elliot Slotnick, Clinton s Second Term
Judiciary: Picking Judges Under Fire, 82 JUDIcATURE 264, 275 tbl.3, 278 tblA (1999);
Sheldon Goldman, Bush's JudicialLegacy: The Final Imprint, 76 JUDICATURE 282 (1993).
Supreme Court appointments drawn from EPSTEIN ET AL, supra note 13, at 318-20.
95.
Clinton's appointments are current through June 2000.
96.
See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 27, at 380-83 (concluding, based on all
nonunanimous and unanimous reversals by courts of appeals between 1961 and 1964, that a
statistically significant relationship exists between party affiliation and voting behavior);
Goldman, supra note 26, at 494-95 (concluding, based on intercorrelations of voting
behavior on issues and ideological voting blocs, "that attitudes and values defined
politically rather than legally may be of prime importance in understanding appeals court
voting behavior"); Nagel, supra note 88, at 845 (demonstrating that party affiliation is
statistically significantly related to the votes of U.S. Supreme Court justices and state
supreme court judges in divided rulings); Daniel R. Pinello, Linking Party to Judicial
Ideology in American Courts: A Meta-Analysis, 20 JUST. Sys. J. 219 (1999) (metaanalyzing 84 empirical studies of the relationship between judges' party identification and
judicial behavior and concluding that party affiliation explains a substantial amount of the
variance in the ideological direction of judicial decisions, particularly on federal courts
(explaining 48% of the variance)).
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entirely to their own party for appointments to the federal bench despite pleas
from various quarters for bipartisan-or apolitical-appointment. As reflected in
Table 2, FDR almost never looked outside the Democratic party for judicial
appointments: only six of his 192 appointments were non-Democrats (or three
percent). Gerald Ford's appointment rate of seventy-eight percent Republicans is
the closest to bipartisanship, and Ford, of course, was acting in the shadow of
Watergate. Both parties have demonstrated comparable party favoritism: 92.2% of
Democratic appointees have been Democrats, and 91.5% of Republican
appointees have been Republicans.
D. The Bottom Line
Policy preferences are strongly related to judges' decisions; personal
attributes and social background are sometimes weakly related but frequently
unrelated to judicial behavior.97 Table 3 summarizes the empirical evidence with
respect to the relationship between judicial characteristics and judges' votes.
While party identification explains a great deal of the variance in judicial
decisions, social background and personal-attribute factors remain relevant to the
extent that they account for judges' choice of parties. Further, these other factors
may be independently important to a president's agenda; for example, a president
may wish to appoint an ethnically diverse bench or to select judges of varied and
complementary professional backgrounds to serve together.

97.
As journals usually publish findings rather than non-findings, I expect that
other unpublished research projects have also failed to find the anticipated relationship
between a judge's attributes or experiences and her decisions. For criticism of social
background models, see Sheldon Goldman & Austin Sarat, Backgrounds and Decisions, in
AMERICAN COURT SYSTEMS 372, 374 (Sheldon Goldman & Austin Sarat eds., 1978)
(explaining weaknesses inherent in social background models); S.Sidney Ulmer, Are Social
BackgroundModels Tine-Bound?, 80 AM. POL. Sc. REv. 957 (1986).
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Table 3. The Relationship Between Individual Factors and Judicial
Behavior Weighing the Explanatory Value
Personal
Attributes

Age

insignificant

Gender

sex
discrimination

suits only

Social Background

Policy Preferences

Race

weak

Religion

insignificant

Education

limited

Prior Judicial Experience

insignificant

Prior Prosecutorial Experience

weak

Prior Public/Elected Office

weak

j Legal Doctrine

moderate

Appointing President

strong

Party Affiliation

strong

The political party result, though a significant social scientific finding,
provides limited guidance to presidents, because it divides potential candidates
into only two--or perhaps three-large, undifferentiated groups of candidates.
Moreover, the desire to pursue a particular ideological agenda typically involves a
certain type of liberalism or conservatism as well as positions on specific legal
issues such as abortion, civil rights, and criminal procedure. Therefore, presidents
would prefer better evidence of the position of candidates on the types of issues
presented to courts. For this reason, and others, presidents may turn to law
faculties for potential nominees. What can presidents expect if they decide to
appoint legal scholars? In the next section, I delineate possible distinctive
characteristics of scholar-jurists.
II. THE BEHAVIOR OF ACADEMICS ON THE APPEALS COURTS
Circuit judges coming from academia may behave in distinctive ways.
The limited literature analyzing the possible effects of professorial experience

looks for academic background to have a single ideological directional effect,
hypothesizing, for example, that former law professors will be more likely to
support union claims or to oppose the Sentencing Guidelines. s These studies
98.
See Brudney et al., supra note 27, at 1715 tbl.I1 (defining legal academic to
include judges with significant adjunct experience); Sisk et al., supra note 30, at 1479-80.
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expect academic experience to influence judges' positions on the merits of cases in
a unidimensional way. Yet such a supposition ignores the honest, intellectual
debates at the heart of legal scholarship that reflect the conflicting views held by
law professors on all issues, including substantive doctrine and procedural rules.
More importantly, professors on the courts were selected by presidents looking for
certain ideological perspectives. Thus, the fact that law professors as a group are
liberal does not mean that scholar-jurists as a group are liberal. We would, instead,
expect academic judges' ideological positions to be as varied as those of the past
century's presidents. The effect of law professor experience, then, cannot be
confined to a single liberal/conservative continuum.
I propose that the academic experience should be examined by analyzing

how it influences judges' "role conceptions."99 Role conception encompasses the

judge's normative view of her position, including her beliefs about the authority of
the individual judge in the legal system. Role conception dictates the action that a
judge will deem appropriate to take. Role conception speaks to the range of
behavior a judge may pursue rather than the ideological direction of that behavior.
Judicial studies occasionally assume-implicitly or explicitly-that
judges share a sufficiently stable view of the judicial role, such that role
conception remains relatively fixed across judges, and that meaningful variation in
observed behavior can be explained primarily by considering the judges'
preferences on the issues. While models based only on judges' preferences can
account for a great deal of the variation in merits votes in Supreme Court cases
and in certain classes of courts of appeals rulings, these models can be improved
by considering the influence of role conception on the ultimate vote in a case as
well as other judicial action."
Judges vested with discretion base their decisions on their preferences in
a particular case as well as their role conception. A judge's view of the appropriate
resolution of the dispute, as measured by either the legal or attitudinal model (or a
hybrid), has a stronger-much stronger-effect than a judge's role conception on
a judge's decision on the merits of a case. A judge's decision in a case reflects her
underlying view on the issues, and role conception says less about that (at least in
any sort of consistent way). Yet, a judge's view of her function in resolving
disputes and interpreting the law will serve as the screen through which the
judge's preferences or legal determinations are filtered. The judge who perceives
her role as primarily institutional will filter out viewpoints that are inconsistent
with the institution's preferences, whether measured by other judges on the panel,
99.

Cf.James L. Gibson, Judges' Role Orientations,Attitudes, and Decisions:

An InteractiveModel, 72 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 911 (1978). Gibson's "role orientation" thesis
is slightly distinct from my "role conception" thesis. He describes judges' individual role
orientations as dictating "the criteria upon which their decisions will be based." Id at 918.
100.
Cf Donald R. Songer et al., Strategic Behavior on the United States Courts
of Appeals (April 1999) (unpublished paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the
Midwest Political Science Association, on file with Author) (showing that judges'
perceptions of the positions of their co-panelists, circuit colleagues, and the Supreme Court
will have an influence on their behavior, overriding legal and attitudinal effects).
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the circuit bench's majority, or the Supreme Court. A judge with a more
individualistic, and typically activist, perspective will be more likely to pursue her
viewpoint unfiltered. Therefore, individualistic judges will more frequently decide
cases according to their preferences as compared to institutionally oriented judges.
The judge's perspective on her role-on archetypal judicial behaviorwill be more important than her preferences in explaining the method by which the
judge carries out her view of the case. The strength of preferences clearly will
affect a judge's desire to state the court's reasons for its decision or to air publicly
disagreement with the majority. But, the judge's view of the judicial function-the
purpose of those actions-will predominate. So, a judge who sees herself as part
of a group undertaking-a team"-is unlikely to work against the group by
acting independently, by dissenting or concurring separately, even when her
opinion on the legal issues is strong. By contrast, a judge who sees herself as an
independent actor, responsible for honestly relaying her views on cases, will be
likely to dissent even when her disagreement with the majority is modest
(although the practical costs of dissent in terms of expended time and strained
collegial relationships may require that the disagreement at least be meaningful).
Therefore, individualistic judges will more frequently express their preferences
publicly as compared to institutionally oriented judges.
A judge's perception of the proper judicial role-as reflected in and
influenced by her prior experience as an academic-may account for the
frequency with which a judge votes her policy preferences (that is, the magnitude
of ideological adherence), the judge's inclination to w'.rite opinions, and the
judge's willingness to defer to colleagues and to precedent. The hypotheses below
are premised on this idea.
A. Scholar-JuristsWill Have a Strong Commitment to Explicit Ideological
Perspectives
Past presidents have selected law professors for judicial posts because
they were able to confidently discern the content of professors' legal philosophies
and their commitment to those views from a published record. FDR, for example,
concluded that the courts of appeals were significant in his battle to protect and
enforce New Deal legislation, and that the individuals best able to do so were men
who had demonstrated their intellectual support of, and belief in, his programs.'0 '
FDR and his advisors looked specifically for academics who could provide a
judicial rationale for his policy agenda."0 2 Reagan, like FDR, viewed the federal

See George, supra note 20, at 3-7.
101.
Consider, for example, FDR's selection of law professor Calvert Magruder
102.
for the First Circuit:
In Attorney General Frank Murphy's official letter recommending
Calvert Magruder for the First Circuit, he described Magruder as "a
scholar of liberal outlook." Magruder's Justice Department file contains
an analysis of an article published two years earlier in the HarvardLaw
Review sympathetic to collective bargaining. The analysis noted that the
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judiciary as crucial to his policy proposals and also looked to law schools for
academics sharing his judicial philosophy-which reinforced his policy agendafor appointment to the appellate bench.' 0 3 Assisted by his close advisor Edwin
Meese, a former law professor himself,"° Reagan searched for conservative legal
scholars who would undo the New Deal liberal judicial doctrine enunciated by
FDR-appointed scholar-jurists. Reagan's advisors on judicial appointments
suggested possible nominees based, in part, on a "[r]eview of available
philosophically compatible law school faculty members."' 5
Future presidents may, like Roosevelt and Reagan, choose legal
academics because a published record of their positions exists. An individual's
views on the legal issues of the type presented to circuit courts can best be gleaned
from her explicit statements on similar subjects and in a comparable style to
appellate opinions. A benefit of selecting a legal academic is that her positions are
more definitely formed and confidently ascertained because a published record
exists. Of course, these views are expressed in a different role than the one of a
judge. Yet, the robe will not transform a person's fundamental perspectives on the
role of law and legal institutions and the working of basic legal principles." 6

article "shows not only a great knowledge of law but an understanding
of and sympathy with social growth."
GOLDMAN, supra note 22, at 36 n.j.
103.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 5, at 5, 68-69 (describing the "model Reagan
[appellate court] nominee" as "a young, intellectually strong academic with little trial or
other legal experience, with strongly held ultraconservative views based on an economic
model"); Sheldon Goldman, Reagan's Second Term Judicial Appointments: The Battle at
Midway, 70 JUDICATURE 324, 324, 326, 333 (1987) (positing that the Reagan
Administration nominated "scholars [who] had a track record of published works so that
their judicial philosophy could be discerned by administration officials').
104.
Meese was a professor and Director of the Center for Criminal Justice Policy
and Management at the University of San Diego School of Law from 1977 through 1981.
See Hoover Institution, Edwin Meese's Home Page (visited on July 12, 2000)
<http:/www-hoover.stanford.edu/BIOS/meese.html>.
105.
GOLDMAN, supra note 22, at 299 (quoting a memorandum from Jonathan C.
Rose, Assistant Attorney General for Legal Policy and lead advisor on judicial
appointments, which recommended Yale law professor Ralph Winter for the Second
Circuit).
106.
A federal trial judge's views on various issues can also be gleaned from a
published record. Though this record will be more limited than the one produced by a
professor, it has the advantage of being the product of judicial processes. The difficulties of
relying on trial judge's writings are their infrequency and limited focus. But, many
presidents have turned to the district courts to find suitable nominees for the courts of
appeals: President Clinton, for example, has regularly selected his court of appeals'
nominations from district courts. See, e.g., Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 94, at 278-79
and tbl.4; see also Daniel Klerman, Nonpromotion andJudicial Independence, 72 S. CAL,
L. REv. 455, 460 (1999) ("Promotion of federal district court judges to court of appeals
judgeships has been common for the last hundred years. During most of this period,
between forty and sixty percent of those appointed to the courts of appeals had previously
served as federal district court judges.").
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FDR and Ronald Reagan sought to appoint law professors to the circuit
courts not only because they knew the professors' legal positions (as reflected in
their writings) but also because they expected professors to pursue those views
once on the bench. FDR and Reagan wanted to select legal academics who were
fully behind their respective (and very different) policy agendas, that is, scholars
who had a demonstrated commitment to one perspective. Thus, I hypothesize that
legal academic experience will lead to more consistently ideological decisionmaking. This hypothesis is also supported by the law professor socialization
process. Law professors gain tenure by writing articles that take a particular
approach to a legal issue, arguing confidently for the penultimate interpretation.
Scholar-jurists, then, should be relatively unwilling to concede that an issue is
capable of more than one legitimate resolution. Moreover, unlike practitioners
who are hired to represent a particular side, law professors choose their
perspective and can become "true believers."
B. Scholar-JuristsWill Write and PublishMore Often Than Their Colleagues
There are many reasons to expect that legal academics will write
frequently when appointed to courts of appeals. First, legal academics are more
likely to take an individualistic outlook on their role as judge because they come
from a job that allows-and rewards-a high degree of autonomy and
independence. They will be less willing to subordinate their personal positions to
the institution's position. Moreover, they may view opinions as opportunities for
intellectual sparring as well as for establishing a reputation as an individual judge.
Second, former legal academics are likely to be able to write more
opinions with less effort than their colleagues as they come from jobs where
opinion-type writing is a central task. In general, the transition from law professor
to appellate judge is an easy one when compared to moving to the bench from
practice or politics. As Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg explained while still on the
D.C. Circuit Court: "[Y]our daily routine [as a circuit judge] is very much the
same as it was in the law school where I taught my class and then went back to my
office and the door was closed and there was my desk and the paper facing me.""'
She noted that judges who come from "a busy commercial practic[e]" or Congress
are "shock[ed] to come into the quiet atmosphere of the courthouse and that's a
real adjustment."'"
Third, law professors are teachers of law and legal principle and may
view opinions as a forum for instructing others as to the meaning of law. J.
Woodford Howard describes and quotes from speeches of former Columbia law
professor and Second Circuit Judge Harold Medina given when he was a district
judge: "The 'most fun' was writing opinions, new outlets for [Medina's] penchant
to teach. 'You can write about anything you wish,' he quipped, 'and leave out any
facts that don't quite fit into the picture.' The only trouble was that nobody read
107.
JUDICATURE

108.

Roundtable, On Becoming a Judge: Socialization to the Judicial Role, 69
139, 144 (1985) (reprinting Judge Ginsburg's comments).
Id.
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them except losers preparing appeals."'" Medina's eagerness to write during his
district judgeship, a role in which relatively few decisions are written,
demonstrates the strength of the literary urge among some former academics.
Fourth, circuit opinions speak to an external audience; this readership
may provide an additional incentive for legal academics to put pen to paper.
Former legal scholars will continue to desire the accolades and individual
recognition achieved through successful scholarship. The primary means for
circuit judges to gain recognition outside their circuit is to write and publish
opinions. Scholar-jurists may be more inclined to dissent in order to communicate
to other judges on the appeals court the appropriateness of en bane review or to
signal to the Supreme Court the value of granting certiorari. Or they may simply
seek to speak to the future, as they so often did in their writings as law professors.
For the foregoing reasons, I hypothesize that circuit judges who were
academics will seek to write more than a "fair" share of majority opinions and will
write more dissents and concurrences. Their individualistic approach to judging
should increase their inclination to write signed, published opinions.
C. Scholar-Jurists Will Write Significant Opinions and/or Develop New
Theories

Law professors seek through their scholarship and teaching to influence
the views of others on the law. Professors who accept appointment to the circuit
courts may do so to gain broader influence through a more prestigious, and
potentially influential, position. They also may crave the opportunity to carry out
the views that they had advocated as an academic. Thus, they would be more
likely to use cases as an opportunity to argue original positions or force the law in
certain directions.
A lawyer who is a law professor is different from lawyers in practice or
government. The differences are produced by the academic socialization process
and also reflect the personality characteristics that lead an individual to pursue a
professorship. Most lawyers, trained in law school and practice to respect
precedent, would be likely to defer to legal rules and doctrines in making their
decisions. Law practice also rewards lawyers who are able to chart published court
rulings, and successful lawyers are more likely to be appointed to prestigious
federal judgeships. These observations undergird the "legal" model of judicial
behavior which contends that judges seek to be (or at least appear to be) neutral
and reasoned decision-makers who defer to rules to guide their decisions. But, law
professors would be less likely to defer to precedent because the very operation of
law school teaching and legal academic publishing is to challenge existing
doctrines. Law professors are rewarded for questioning court rulings and for
thinking unconventionally.
109.
J. Woodford Howard, Jr., Judge Harold R. Medina: The "Freshman"Years,
69 JUDICATURE 126, 130 & n.24 (1985) (quoting from Medina's 1948 address to the
Federation of Bar Associations of the 6th Judicial District in Elmira, New York, and
Medina, Some Reflections on the JudicialFunction, 38 A.B.A. J. 107 (1952)).
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One of the arguments made to support a legal-or more appropriately
neo-legal-model of judicial decision-making is that legal training teaches
students a strong allegiance to precedent such that they are unlikely when judges
to be willing to make a decision inconsistent with prior decisions. By the same
reasoning, the professors, who teach stare decisis to students, would not feel as
bound by precedent, because their teaching and scholarship requires a willingness
to challenge prior approaches and to stake out new ones. Or perhaps former law
professors are more likely to see the law as teeming with uncertainty because of

the academic enterprise of focusing on areas of uncertainty or, some may say, of

creating uncertainty for intellectual purposes where none need exist.11° Former
practitioners better appreciate, perhaps, the value of stare decisis for it guided their
daily work life, advice to clients, litigation strategies, and the like: the regularity
and stability of law is essential to effective and profitable practice.
FDR's and Reagan's selection of academics for appellate court posts can
be seen as extremely savvy if scholar-jurists are more active on the bench. Both
presidents wanted to revolutionize the federal government and the rights of
individuals and corporations. Both needed judges who would be willing to reverse
existing precedent as well as set new precedent. Herman Schwartz, a liberal critic
of Reagan's judicial appointments and himself a law professor, argued that law
professors are specially suited for this task because the function of academics who
challenge mainstream thought (which aptly describes the ideologically contrasting
nominees of FDR and Reagan) is to "criticize. This induces a readiness-indeed,
an eagerness-to correct what the critic considers wrongheaded. There is little
respect for precedent and not much for stability, regardless of the lip service to
judicial restraint""'

IlI. EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF ACADEMICS ON THE APPEALS
COURTS

To test my scholar-jurist hypotheses, I examine the opinions and behavior
of courts of appeals judges with academic experience. Drawing on judicial
biographies published by the Federal Judicial Center".2 as well as the Almanac of
the FederalJudiciary"3 and Sheldon Goldman's published scholarship on judicial

110.

Cf.Dorothy B. James, Role Theory and the Supreme Court, 30 J.POL 160,

168 (1968) (quoting Justice William 0. Douglas, Address to the American Bar Association,
Section of Judicial Administration, Seattle, Washington at 4 (Sept. 9, 1948)) (quoting a
speech of Justice Douglas, who was formerly a member of the Yale law faculty, in which
Douglas maintained that "the law will always teem with uncertainty").
111.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 5, at 69.
112.
Federal Judicial Center, Judges ofthe UnitedStates, supra note 1.
113.
2 AUIAN4AC OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (1999). 1 also reviewed law journal
articles summarizing judicial biographies for different circuits. See Judges of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 29 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. xiii (1999);
Remembering the Fourth CircuitJudges:A Historyfrom 1941 to 1998, 55 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 47 (1998). In addition, I searched for books and articles on the backgrounds of
individual judges.
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appointments," 4 I coded as an academic any judge who was a full-time, tenuretrack/tenured law professor at the time of nomination or earlier in her career." 5 I
only treat as former law professors those judges who worked full-time as a
professor on a law school faculty. I did not code judges who served as adjunct or
visiting professors or as lecturers as former law professors. In addition, the law
professor category does not include judges who had previously held the title of
"law professor" (without an "adjunct" or "visiting" modifier) but were working
full-time in another post (typically, full-time law practice or government service).
The reason for excluding these judges is that they were not primarily law
professors and thus were not undergoing the same socialization process, such as
seeking tenure, working independently, and participating in law school decisionmaking.
Using this methodology, I found that from FDR's first administration
through June 1, 2000, presidents have successfully named sixty law professors and
former law professors to the courts of appeals, more than thirteen percent of
circuit appointments for that period. Presidents have varied significantly in the
degree to which they turned to law faculties for courts of appeals judges as
reflected in figure 1. FDR has had the highest rate of academic appointments: he
appointed twelve law professors to the intermediate appellate courts out of fifty
appointees, nearly one-quarter of his appointments. Neither Eisenhower nor Ford
used any of their forty-five and eleven respective circuit appointments to name a
legal scholar.
Fig. 1. Presidential Appointments of Professors to Courts of Appe
25
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The appointment rate also has varied by circuit, as reflected in Figure
2.116 The D.C. Circuit could appropriately be dubbed the "Ivory Circuit" with
114.

115.

See GOLDMAN, supra note 22.
My numbers do not always agree with Professor Goldman's. In some

instances, Professor Goldman is only including judges appointed directly from law school
faculties.
116.
In a study of circuit judges' backgrounds, the authors report the percentage
of judges with substantial law professor experience, including adjunct appointments,
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former academics comprising one-third of the judges who have served on the
court (fourteen out of forty-two). In contrast, only one law professor has been
appointed to the original Fifth Circuit and its progeny, the new Fifth and the
Eleventh, despite the fact that seventy-three judges have been appointed during
this period.
Figure 2. Academics by Circuit: FDR to Clinton
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Scholar-jurists have not had a uniform academic experience prior to
judicial appointment. Courts of appeals judges, from 1937 to present, taught fulltime on fifty different law school faculties (some judges worked at several).
Nineteen judges-or one-third-served as dean of their schools (four at two
different schools). The average academic tenure was fourteen years with a median
and mode of thirteen; the longest time as a professor prior to appointment was
thirty-five years, the shortest was one year. Thirty-eight judges were appointed to
the courts of appeals directly from law school faculties. The remaining twenty-two
judges worked in various posts between their law school and circuit appointments:
a number served on state courts or federal district courts, or worked for federal
agencies. The average judge had left law school teaching nine years before
receiving her circuit commission.
I wanted to test empirically the hypotheses that former academics behave
distinctively as compared to their colleagues on the bench by voting more
ideologically, writing more frequently, and seeking to develop new legal theories
or approaches. To do so, I utilized two different methods of analysis: systematic,
statistical examination of large numbers of cases to get an overall sense of
academics on the courts, complemented by historic, descriptive evidence drawn
from many sources, including biographies, contemporary accounts, and judicial
opinions, in order to consider in greater detail the actions of scholar-jurists.
appointed to each circuit from 1891-1992. See Susan Haire ct al., An Intercircuit Profile of
Judges on the U.S. Courts ofAppeals, 78 JUDICATURE 101 (1994). For the entire period: 1st
Circuit-20.8%; 2d-38%; 3d-22%; 4th-15.2%; 5th & Ilth-12.2%; 6th-9.6%; 7th-22%;
8th-18.7%; 9th-18.3%; 10th-26.9%; D.C.-45.3%. See id. at 102.
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A. IdeologicalBehavior ofFormerAcademics

As explained previously, circuit judges may choose to pursue their public
policy preferences in cases where the answer is not dictated by law. Not all circuit
court cases grant judges sufficient leeway to allow for the consideration of
personal preferences, because courts of appeals do not share the Supreme Court's
prerogative to select cases for review. Many appeals courts decisions involve
routine examinations of lower court outcomes, primarily using highly deferential
standards of review, such as abuse of discretion or plain error. Where law and
precedent provide weak guidelines rather than mandates, the judge's decision is
more likely to be the product of attitudes and environment." 7
One subset of circuit court decisions, en bane cases, allow for the
consideration of the influence of policy preferences on individual judge's
decisions. As the name implies, en bane cases are heard by the entire circuit
bench: all active circuit judges as well as any senior circuit judge of that circuit
who sat on the panel, if one was convened. Such decisions allow us to view circuit
court behavior when acting in concert. Hence, en bane cases provide us with a
more coherent body of jurists from which to extrapolate regarding the politics of
deciding appeals at the circuit court level. In addition, en bane hearing procedures,
like the certiorari process, limit the cases reviewed by the entire court to those
selected by a majority of the court's members (a greater percentage than the
Supreme Court's required four out of nine). This procedure creates the
presumption that the cases are likely to involve difficult, complex, highly political,
or at least significant questions. Thus, en bane decisions, as opposed to the
majority of routine appeals taken right from lower federal courts or agencies,
should test whether judges make decisions based on policy preferences."'

117.
See Cook, supra note 45, at 233.
118.
Christopher Smith reasons further that en bane cases provide an effective
means of examining intermediate courts because (1) the cases "frequently emanate from the
existence of conflict among a circuits' judges" and (2) the expanded size of the deliberative
body increases the likelihood of dissent. See Christopher Smith, Polarization and Change in
the FederalCourts: En Banc Decisionsin the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 74 JUDICATURE 133,
134 (1990). Smith uses en bane cases decided between 1983 and 1988 to examine the
theory that Reagan appointees to the courts of appeals are more conservative and polemic
than other judges. The study documents the existence of Reagan-appointed voting blocs in
appellate cases, but these polarized decisions have been concentrated in two circuits (the
D.C. and Eighth Circuits) and are mirrored by a similar number of Carter-appointeAl voting
blocs. See id.
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I reviewed all Second, Fourth, and Eighth Circuit en bane cases decided
prior to 1999 to test the hypothesis that scholar-jurists were more likely than their
colleagues to vote ideologically. Six former law professors decided a sufficient
number of en bane cases for consideration, two on each circuit:
Table 4. Testing the Ideology Hypothesis: Circuit Judges Considered

2nd
Circuit

4th
Circuit

Appointing
President

Last Academic Position

Charles Clark

FDR

Yale Law Dean

Paul Hays

JFK

Columbia Law Professor

J. Dickson
Phillips

Carter

North Carolina Law Dean

J. Harvie

Reagan

Virginia Law Professor

Reagan

UMKC Law Dean

Bush

Indiana Lav Dean

Wilkinson

8th

Pasco

Circuit

Bowman
Morris Arnold

Although nine academics have served on the Second Circuit, only two
participated in a substantial number of en bane decisions, both serving as active
judges prior to the 1980s." 9 FDR appointee Charles Clark was the most
consistently liberal judge during his active service from 1939 to 1963, and he was
the second most consistently ideological voter.2 He took the liberal position in
more than seventy-eight percent of the thirty-two en bane cases in which he
participated; Clark's party affiliation was statistically significantly related to his
decisions.' 2 ' By contrast, JFK appointee Paul Hays was as likely to vote for the
conservative position as the liberal one (nineteen liberal votes out of thirty-eight
en bane decisions). In this regard, he behaved like his Second Circuit colleague

119.
Academics serving on the Second Circuit in the 1980s and 90s did not have
the opportunity to sit on many en bane panels because the Second Circuit has dramatically
decreased its en bane hearings to less than one per year on average, making it the least
likely circuit to grant en bane review. See Tracey E. George, The Dynamics and
Determinantsof the Decision to Grant En Banc Review, 74 WASH. L. Rv. 213, 250 n.170
(1999).
120.
Eisenhower appointee Moore was slightly more consistent in his ideological
position, voting in favor of the conservative position in 80% of the en bane cases in which
he participated.
A logistic regression found that the relationship between party affiliation and
121.
Clark's en bane votes was significant at the .001 level.
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Irving Kaufman, another JFK appointee who served on the court for a long period
(twenty-seven liberal votes out of fifty-two decisions). JFK's third appointment to
the Second Circuit, Thurgood Marshall, was more likely to favor the liberal
position than either Hays or Kaufman.
Both Fourth Circuit judges examined here came directly from law school
posts (Phillips after eighteen years and Wilkinson after two separate stints for a
total of six years), and both were relatively consistent in the ideological direction
of their decisions. Wilkinson was nearly the most conservative judge during this
period (out of fourteen Republican appointees), voting conservatively in eightynine percent of seventy-nine en banc cases.'2 He was the most conservative
Reagan appointee. Phillips was the fifth most liberal judge during the entire period
(out of twelve Democratic appointees), deciding two-thirds of ninety-five en bane
cases in a liberal direction. Party affiliation was statistically significantly related to
both judges' en banc votes."
Pasco Bowman and Morris Arnold took somewhat different routes to the
Eighth Circuit, and their subsequent behavior may reflect this fact." 4 Bowman
came directly from the University of Missouri at Kansas City deanship, after
nineteen years as an academic. Morris Arnold spent seven years on the federal
district court (having spent eleven years on law faculties at Arkansas, Indiana, and
Pennsylvania) before his appointment to the circuit court where his brother, who
was appointed by Carter, already served. Ideology was statistically significantly
related to Bowman's votes." Moreover, Bowman was the second most
conservative of all judges who served during the period (which included twenty
Republican appointees), voting conservatively in eighty percent of the ninety en
banc cases in which he participated. Morris Arnold, by contrast, did not vote in an
ideological fashion: he was equally as likely to vote in a liberal direction as in a
conservative one.
What accounts for the distinction between these two scholar-jurists,
Republican appointees, and Eighth Circuit colleagues? Bowman was selected for
the circuit court by a president seeking academics with the proper ideologicalintellectual credentials, Arnold was not. Bowman joined the circuit court directly
from a law school faculty, Arnold did not. Arnold frequently sits on panels with
his older brother and former law partner, Richard Arnold, who is a Democrat; they
have a high rate of agreement in their decisions. The confluence of these factors
122.

Bush appointee Luttig voted for the conservative position 90 percent of the

time.
123.
A logistic regression found that the relationship between party affiliation and
each judge's en banc votes was significant at the .001 level for both judges.

124.
A third academic, Harvey Johnsen, was appointed by FDR to the Eighth
Circuit, but he is not included here because he participated in only nine en bane cases. In
those cases, he was as liberal as other FDR appointees. Johnsen worked in various positions

(private practice, corporate counsel, and state judge) for fourteen years after having spent
four years on the Creighton law school faculty. See Federal Judicial Center, Judges of the

UnitedStates Courts (visited Feb. 27, 2001) <http:llair.fjc.gov/history/judges-frm.html>.
125.
A logistic regression found that the relationship between party affiliation and
Bowman's en banc votes was significant at the .001 level.
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explains Arnold's apparent non-ideological voting. Bush's appeals court
appointees have proven to be substantially more liberal than Reagan's circuit
judges.'26 And Arnold's seven years as a district court judge likely made him more
moderate still. Lawyers appointed to a federal court after experience on a state
bench or a lower federal court may be more circumspect about their authority than
non-judge lawyers.'27 They may be more understanding-and forgiving-of the
mistakes that can be made during a trial. They may also place greater value on
collegiality and agreement with colleagues. Therefore, judicial experience may be

associated with a tendency to defer to other judges." This would certainly

account for Arnold's middle-of-the-road approach; however, it is not wholly
consistent with Arnold's high opinion-writing rates as discussed in the next
section.
The empirical evidence suggests that when presidents select academics
based on a desire to achieve certain policy aims, they are successful. Academics
appointed by FDR and Reagan were more likely than other scholar-jurists to
follow the ideological positions of their appointing president. Moreover, FDR and
Reagan judges who were law professors were among the most consistently
ideological of all judges.
Other empirical studies of Reagan's circuit court appointments lend
support to this conclusion. The four most conservative judges in a Columbia Lm
Review study were scholar-jurists Robert Bork, Frank Easterbrook, Antonin
Scalia, and Ralph Winter, who "[a]s a group...voted on the liberal side of the case
only 12% of the time, far less than the 34% rate for the rest of the Reagan judges,
and the 35% for other GOP appointees."' A fifth scholar-jurist appointed by
Reagan, Seventh Circuit Judge Richard Posner, also voted in a more consistently
ideological manner than other Reagan judges-taking the conservative side of a
case approximately seventy percent of the time-but was not as extreme as the
other four. 3 ' Several articles examining the D.C. Circuit's voting record have
reported that Reagan changed the court to a decidedly conservative one by
appointing four conservative scholars (Bork, Douglas Ginsburg, Scalia, and
126.
Robert A. Carp et al., The Voting BehaviorofJudges Appointed by President
Bush, 76 JuDicnATU 298, 301 tbl.3 (1993) (reporting that Bush appeals court judges as
compared to Reagan courts of appeals judges voted in favor of criminal defendants in 20%
versus 15% of the cases, in favor of civil rights and liberties claimants in 34% versus 25%
of the cases, and in favor of unions and the economically disadvantaged in 44% versus 35%
of the cases).
127.
Cf HowARD,supra note 67, at 168 tbl.6.4, 169 (reporting that none of the
"former U.S. district judges [in his circuit court study] espoused a highly innovative view of
his job").
128.
See Goldman, supra note 26, at 501-02 (observing a statistically significant
relationship between prior judicial experience and rate of dissent: circuit judges with
previous experience dissented much less frequently, and reporting that "prior judicial
experience was the most important variable for the dissents category").
129.
Timothy B. Tomasi & Jess A. Velona, All the President'sMen? A Study of
Ronald Reagan's Appointments to the U.S. Courts ofAppeals,87 COLUM. L. REV. 766, 779
n.66 (1987).
130.
See id.
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Stephen Williams)' to the court, considered by many to be second only to the
Supreme Court in its influence.'32
B. Scholar-Jurists'Opinion-WritingPractices
A wealth of descriptive accounts exists to support the hypothesis that
academics on the bench seek to write more frequently than their colleagues. For
example, FDR-appointed scholar-jurist Henry Edgerton was renowned for writing
separately in an effort to convince fellow judges on his court as well as others to

adopt his progressive views. According to the introductory biography to a
published collection of Edgerton's D.C. Circuit opinions, "Judge Edgerton never
forg[ot] that.. .he must convince both his orthodox colleagues and the members of
the Supreme Court that his position [was] correct."'3 In one highly public
instance, Edgerton made use of his skill at persuasive writing to set forth a dissent
in "the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee case that induced a member of the

Supreme Court to join with four of his brethren to overrule the [D.C.) Court of
Appeals."'3 Likewise, Second Circuit Judge Charles E. Clark, another FDR
appointee, was considered his circuit's leading dissenter. 35 He reported writing
concurrences or dissents initially to try to persuade the other two panelists to

change their views on the case.' 36 If they did not, Clark would publish the separate
opinions.
More recently, then-D.C. Circuit Judge Robert Bork, identified by most
court watchers as the court's "conservative stalwart" during his tenure, was
"instrumental in getting judges to vote to rehear a panel's decision en banc."' 3 For
instance, in a December 1986 case with two Carter appointees, Bork wrote a one131.

See, e.g., Kenneth Karpay, The D.C. Circuit'sNew Face: Litigators Revamp

Strategies to Suit "Reorganized" Bench, LEGAL TIMES, May 4, 1987, at 1; Note, The
Politics of En Banc Review, 102 HARV. L. REV. 864, 874 (1989) (examining the en banc

decisions of the D.C. Circuit after Reagan appointees attained a majority and concluding,
"The confluence of bloc voting by Reagan-appointed judges to reverse liberal panels on
contentious issues in several instances suggests the emergence of a trend toward the use of
en banc review to advance ideological and partisan goals"); Revesz, supra note 89, at
1762-63; Patricia M. Wald, "...Doctor,Lawyer, Merchant, Chief', 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1127, 1150 (1992). The author observed that the D.C. Circuit in 1992 "is a sharply divided
[court], and a new majority is making substantial changes in our jurisprudence ...some of
that new law is being made on the court's own initiative by overruling prior circuit
precedent en banc or by distinguishing or weakening it in panel opinions." Id.
132.
Former D.C. Circuit Judge Patricia Wald noted that more than 200 D.C.
Circuit cases produced headlines in the New York Times and Washington Post during her
five-year term as chiefjudge. Wald, supra note 131, at 1143.
133.
FREEDOM IN THE BALANCE: OPINIONS OF JUDGE HENRY
RELATING TO CIVIL LIBERTIES 14 (Eleanor Bontecou ed., 1960)

134.

Id.

135.

See MARVIN SCHICK, LEARNED HAND'S COURT 75 (1970).

136.
137.

W.

EDGERTON

See id.
Karpay, supra note 132, at 13; see also PUBLIC CITIZEN LITIGATION GROUP,
THE JUDICIAL RECORD OF JUDGE ROBERT H. BORK (1987) (criticizing Bork for using judicial
opinions for this purpose).
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paragraph concurrence to a decision granting standing to environmental interest
groups challenging the EPA's auto fuel standards. Bork explained that he did not
agree with the panel's decision but felt bound by an existing circuit precedent until
such time as the full court overruled it. He essentially invited the court to reverse
its position, and the court accepted. Bork extended similar invitations in cases in
which he was not on the panel.'38
In addition to what is essentially anecdotal evidence, an empirical study
of judicial influence found that Seventh Circuit judges and former University of
Chicago law professors Posner (81.5) and Easterbrook (64.1) had the two highest
average numbers of signed majority opinions per year among all judges sitting on
the courts of appeals in 1995 (and who had served six or more years).' Only
seven other judges published more than fifty signed opinions per year.'
To examine systematically the opinion-writing rate of scholar-jurists, I
looked at five courts of appeals for the 1997 and 1998 calendar years. I searched
WESTLAW for all panels in which a former-academic judge participated during
4' I then examined each case to categorize the judge's participation, if
this period.'
14

any-

As reflected in table 5, eight of the ten scholar-jurists who were active
judges during the entire period published majority opinions at a higher rate than

we would expect if they were authoring merely a fair share of such opinions (onethird of published and signed unanimous panel decisions and one-half of divided
panel decisions). Judge Diane Wood, who was on the law faculty at Georgetown
for one year and at University of Chicago for twelve years, wrote slightly fewer
opinions (less than one-half of one percent) than expected. The only judge to write
at a significantly lower rate than expected also had the shortest academic tenure:
Jose Cabranes was a law professor for only two years at Rutgers University, at the
rank of assistant professor (untenured) for the entire period. By contrast, the other

138.
See id.
See William M. Landes et al., Judicial Influence: A Citation Analysis of
139.
FederalCourts ofAppeals Judges, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 271,278, 278-79 n.20 (1998).
140.
See id.
141.
I searched the circuit's case database using the "PA" search term, which is
overinclusive, capturing many cases in which the judge did not in fact participate in a

merits resolution. For example, "PA" listed cases in which an en banc or other rehearing
vote was taken, in which a judge initially sat on a panel but later recused herself, and in the
case of the Eighth Circuit, decisions by the outgoing Chief Judge Richard Arnold to
indicate that Bowman was the incoming Chief Judge.
142.
1 did not rely on the numbers produced by using WESTLAW search terms

such as "JU" for majority opinions, "DIS" for dissents, and "CON" for concurrences,
because it is not an accurate method of determining the number of dissents, concurrences,
or majority opinions that a judge issued. These search terms capture all sorts of irrelevant
cases. Several studies have tried to bypass the time-consuming data collection that is

necessary to report opinion rates in the circuit courts by using the WESTLAW terms. These
studies' numbers are not reliable, because the WESTLAW search terms produce
inconsistent results.
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nine former professors served at least six years as academics and all earned tenure
and the rank of full professor.
Table 5. Majority Opinion Publication Rates for Academics on Five
Appeals Courts: 1997 and 1998
Judge

Circuit

Majority
Opinions

Expected
Majority
Opinion
Rate 143

Difference

Cabranes

2nd

32.0%

34.4%

-2.2%

Calabresi

2nd

43.3%

34.3%

11.0%

Winter, R.

2nd

37.4%

34.4%

3.0%

Sloviter

3rd

50.6%

34.2%

16.4%

Wilkinson

4th

58.7%

34.1%

24.6%

Easterbrook

7th

42.0%

34.3%

7.7%

Posner

7th

44.2%

34.2%

10.0%

Wood, D.

7th

32.2%

33.8%

-0.4%

Bowman

8th

38.1%

33.8%

4.3%

Arnold, M.

8th

38.1%

33.8%

4.3%

The evidence from 1997 and 1998 strongly supports the hypothesis that
scholar-jurists will write signed and published majority opinions more frequently
than expected, but evidence is nearly as strong on whether they also seek to write
opinions when not assigned the majority opinion as reflected in table 6. The
concurrence rate for each judges is the percentage of all published cases
(excluding those in which the judge wrote the majority opinion) in which the
judge concurred, and the dissent ,rate is the percentage in which the judge
dissented. The circuit average is based on all published circuit decisions during
this period. It assumes that a judge has an opportunity to dissent or concur in each
case in which she does not write the majority opinion.

143.
The majority opinion authorship expected rate is based on the expectation
that an average judge will write one-third of majority opinions for unanimous panel rulings
and half of the majority opinions for two-judge majorities.
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Table 6. Dissenting and Concurring Opinion Authorship Rates for
Academics
on Five Appeals Courts: 1997 and 1998
Judge

Circuit

Concurrence rate

Circuit
Average'"

Dissent
rate

Circuit
Average

Cabranes

2nd

2.5%

1.1%

0.0%

2.2%

Calabresi

2nd

2.3%

1.1%

4.7%

2.2%

Winter, R.

2nd

1.1%

1.1%

4.4%

2.2%

Sloviter

3rd

8.7%

0.6%

4.4%

0.6%

Wilkinson

4th

4.7%

2.3%

7.0%

4.8%

Phillips (Sr.)

4th

3.3%

2.3%

6.6%

4.8%

Easterbrook

7th

1.5%

1.3%

0.5%

2.0%

Posner

7th

0.5%

1.3%

0.0%

.0%

Wood, D.

7th

3.2%

1.3%

1.8%

2.0%

Bowman

8th

0.0%

1.5%

0.0%

3.7%

Arnold, M.S.

8th

1.6%

1.5%

8.9%

3.7%

Scholar jurists did not concur or dissent with much frequency, but neither
did their colleagues: separate opinions are extremely rare according to this sample.
Judges Cabranes, Calabresi, Phillips, Wilkinson, Sloviter, and Arnold wrote
concurrences and dissents at a higher rate (in some cases, a much higher rate) than
their circuit colleagues, but the other judges did not.
Finally, former law professors are much more likely than their colleagues
to use their majority opinion to reverse the lower court or agency's decision as
shown in table 7. This relatively high reversal rate ma), reflect law professors'
efforts to move the court away from prior approaches. The scholar-jurist was not
acting alone as at least one other judge agreed with her opinions; however, the
higher rate for majority opinions by former academics is consistent with the
hypothesis that scholar-jurists use opinions to forward new ideas. Since district
courts follow prior court rulings, circuit court decisions changing the law will
necessarily reverse the lower court. The next section considers whether academics
on the bench do in fact advocate new legal doctrines.

144.

Circuit average isbased on a random sample of published circuit cases from

1997 and 1998.
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Table 7. Reversal Rates for Academics on Five Appeals Courts: 1997
and 1998
Judge

Circuit

Reversal

Difference

rate

Circuit
Reversal
Rate145

Cabranes

2nd

42.5%

17.8%

24.7%

Calabresi

2nd

55.7%

17.8%

37.9%

Winter, R.

2nd

47.8%

17.8%

30.0%

Sloviter

3rd

36.6%

24.8%

11.8%

Wilkinson

4th

35.2%

17.1%

18.1%

Easterbrook

7th

33.3%

17.4%

15.9%

Posner

7th

29.0%

17.4%

11.6%

Wood, D.

7th

27.0%

17.4%

9.6%

Bowman

8th

29.0%

17.5%

11.5%

Arnold, M.S.

8th

29.5%

17.5%

12.0%

C.Scholar-JuristsAs Innovative and InfluentialDecision-Makers
Former law professors appointed to the circuit bench have frequently
used cases as a means of moving the law in new directions. It is difficult to
measure empirically the innovativeness ofjudges. I consider here examples of five
scholar-jurists who forwarded new legal ideas through their judicial opinions. I
also review studies of judicial influence demonstrating the significant reach of
scholar-jurists' ideas.
1.JudicialOpinions as a Vehiclefor Cutting-EdgeLegal Ideas
FDR selected judges from law school faculties who had advocated
progressive perspectives on the role of government and the rights of individuals.
FDR and his advisors were probably influenced in their decision to appoint
Edgerton to the D.C. Circuit by Edgerton's scholarship. Shortly before his
145.

This is the reversal rate as drawn from the annual reports of the

Administrative Office of the United States Courts.

ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S.
COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS: 1999 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
DIRECTOR Tbl. 5-1 (1999); ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL
BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS: 1998 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR Tbl. 5-1

(1999).
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appointment, Edgerton published an article questioning judicial decisions striking
acts of Congress, though he pointedly avoided consideration of Supreme Court
New Deal cases.Y6 Edgerton argued that judicial review of federal statutes
frequently benefitted "the well-to-do minority" and did "harm to common men.'4' 7
In a 1935 essay, Professor Edgerton constructed his model of a liberal judge as
one who has a "tolerance of change" and "an effective sympathy with the
underdog."' 43 Judge Edgerton pursued that ideal on the bench and quickly
established himself as a leader of the D.C. Circuit's liberal wing, issuing
progressive,
sometimes dissenting, opinions in the areas of civil rights and
149
liberties.

FDR appointee Edgerton wrote many revolutionary opinions in the civil
rights and liberties areas. Most of the opinions were dissents, but on repeated
occasions, the Supreme Court eventually agreed with his position. For example, he
was the first to deny the validity of racial covenants in housing contracts and to
conclude that the segregation of D.C. public schools was unconstitutional-both
in dissenting opinions.' He did not feel constrained by precedent that no longer
was persuasive: "To let judges who lived and died in other times and other places
make our decisions would be to abdicate as judges and serve as tellers.""'
Reagan-appointee Scalia also took the position that recent precedent
should be ignored by circuit judges when it was inconsistent with earlier, more
sound rulings." For example, shortly after his D.C. Circuit appointment, Scalia
146.
See Henry White Edgerton, The Incidence of Judicial Control over
Congress, 22 CORNELL L.Q. 299, 299 n.t, 348 (1937).
147.
Id.
148.
Henry White Edgerton, A LiberalJudge-CuthbertIV.Pound, 21 CoRFNELL
L.Q. 7, 8 (1935).
149.

Edgerton sought to be watchful of the rights of disadvantaged groups,
FREEDOM INTHE BALANCE: OPINIONS OF JUDGE
EDGERTON RELATING TO CIVIL LIBERTIES 9-11 (Eleanor Bontecou ed., 1960). He

protestors, and criminal defendants. See
HENRY W.

fought restrictions on freedom of speech. See id. at 13. "He was the first to write an
opinion-a dissent-denying the validity of restrictive covenants banning the sale or lease
of real property to Negroes." Id. at 13 (citing Mays v. Burgess); see also Chaplin v. United
States, 157 F.2d 697, 699, 700 (2d Cir. 1946). The Supreme Court agreed with him in the
second case, Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948), in which he took this position. He vas
also the first to write (again in a dissent) that segregation of public schools of the District of
Columbia was unconstitutional. See FREEDOM INTHE BALANCE, supra at 13 (citing Carr v.

Coming). He consistently took the liberal position in non-unanimous cases. See Sheldon
Goldman, Conflict and Consensus in the United States Courts of Appeals, 1968 Wis. L.
REv. 461,473 (1968).

150.

Mays v. Burgess, 147 F.2d 869 (D.C. Cir. 1945) (Edgerton, J., dissenting)

(racial covenants); Carr v. Coming, 182 F.2d 14 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (Edgerton, J., dissenting)
(school segregation).
151.
Chaplin v. United States, 157 F.2d 697, 699, 700 (2d Cir. 1946) (Edgerton,
J., dissenting)
152.
See Richard Nagareda, Comment: The Appellate Jurisprudenceof Justice
Antonin Scalia, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 705, 738 (1987) (concluding based on a detailed
consideration of Scalia's D.C. Circuit opinions that his "jurisprudence in administrative and
first amendment law calls for substantial change in existing legal doctrines").
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published an article advocating that courts only grant standing to plaintiffs who
demonstrate a "concrete injury" produced by acts "directed" against them and
further that "courts need to accord greater weight than they have in recent times to
the traditional requirement that the plaintiff's alleged injury be a particularized
one, which sets him apart from the citizenry at large." ' Scalia conceded that his
position was not entirely consistent with contemporary Supreme Court standing
decisions but argued that his restrictive view of standing was required by earlier
rulings. He expressed hope that the Court would "return" to the position he
advocated."u In a seeming effort to encourage the Court's return, Scalia wrote two
D.C. Circuit opinions adopting this stringent standing requirement and denying
standing to plaintiffs.'55
Reagan's selection of Scalia to the court that oversees administrative
agencies is emblematic of what his administration hoped to achieve through the
appointment of scholars to the bench. Scalia was an expert on administrative law
who argued for a turning back of many policies adopted by Democratic
administrations beginning with FDR and justified by Democratic appointees to the
federal courts. On the D.C. Circuit, he was well-situated to correct the mistakes he
perceived in agency law, and he did so by utilizing a textualist approach to
statutory interpretation.'56 Scalia wrote 133 published opinions during his four
years as a circuit judge including 114 majority, six concurring, five "concur and
dissent", six concurring, and two statements on a denial of rehearing.' 57 More than
two-thirds of his opinions involved questions of administrative law, either whether
plaintiffs had standing to challenge administrative agency decisions or whether
agencies acted within their powers.' 58 He used these cases as an opportunity to
move administrative legal doctrine in a different direction.
Reagan appointed Chicago law professors Richard Posner and Frank
Easterbrook to the Seventh Circuit, to which they have brought a decidedly
153.
Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the
Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 881, 881-82, 895 (1983) (setting forth a

revised version of a lecture given at Suffolk University Law School); see also Antonin
Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme Court, 1978 S.CT.

REV.345 (1978).
154.

Id. at 897-99.

155.
See Block v. Meese, 793 F.2d 1303 (D.C. Cir. 1986); United Presbyterian
Church in the U.S.A. v. Reagan, 738 F.2d 1375 (D.C. Cir. 1984); see also Center for Auto
Safety v. National Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 793 F.2d 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Scalia,
J., dissenting); In re Center for Auto Safety, 793 F.2d 1346 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (dissenting from majority's grant of standing to consumer advocacy groups in
two related cases challenging National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's reduction

in fuel economy standards).
156.
See, e.g., Hirschey v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 777 F.2d 1,7-8
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia, J.,
concurring); see generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New
Textualism, 37 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 621, 650 n.l14 (1990) (listing Scalia's textualist

opinions).
157.
RICHARD A. BRISBIN,
REVIVAL 35-36 (1997).
158.
See id. at 35.

JR., JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA AND THE CONSERVATIVE
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"Chicago School" reputation. Admirers as well as critics of Chicago School law
and economics have credited (or blamed) Posner and Easterbrook for bringing
economic analysis to decisions in areas ranging from securities regulation 5 ' to
constitutional law"W to statutory interpretation.16' The Chicago judges gained a
particularly strong reputation for their judicial attack on antitrust laws, following
through on a hostility reflected in work published prior to appointment' 62 Twentyone state attorneys general filed an unsuccessful amici curiae brief asking the
Supreme Court to review a Seventh Circuit antitrust decision, arguing that the
circuit, in cases decided by Posner and Easterbrook, was ignoring Supreme Court
precedent in order to find in favor of defendant businesses."' Posner and
159.
See, e.g., Flamm v. Eberstadt, 814 F.2d 1169 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J.
authoring majority opinion) (citing numerous law and economics articles including his own,
Frank H. Easterbrook & Gregg A. Jarrell, Do Targets Gainfrom Defeating Tender Offers?,
59 N.Y.U. L. REv. 277, 289-91, 294-99 (1984)). For a case in which Posner and
Easterbrook utilized economic analysis to arrive at sharply conflicting opinions with
Easterbrook citing Posner's academic writings in support of his position, see Jordan v. Duff
& Phelps Inc., 815 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J. authoring majority opinion and
(3d ed.
Posner, J., dissenting) (citing RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAWV
1986)). Seventh Circuit Judge Cudahy, the third member of that panel, wrote a two
paragraph concurrence explaining that the case was a hard one and that "[b]oth the majority
opinion and the dissent argue lucidly and cogently (and ingeniously) their respective points

of view," but that he ultimately was persuaded by Easterbrook. Id. at 443 (Cudahy, J.,
concurring).

See, e.g., Menora v. Illinois High School Assoc., 683 F.2d 1030 (7th Cir.
160.
1982) (Posner, J., majority opinion) (applying a cost-benefit analysis to uphold a high
school regulation prohibiting headwear as applied to Jewish players wishing to wear
yarmulkes); American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois v. City of St. Charles, 794 F.2d 265
(7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J., opinion for unanimous panel including Easterbrook) (utilizing a
least-cost-avoider like approach to affirm injunction against a city's display of a cross). See
generally Martha Middleton, Shaping a Circuit in the ChicagoSchool Image, NAT't L.J.,
July 20, 1987, at 1.
161.
Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. Rev. 533 (1983)
(forwarding a "textualist" approach to statutory interpretation, which eschews legislative
history in favor the objective meaning of the legislative text); see generally Charles Tiefer,
The Reconceptualization of Legislative History in the Supreme Court, 2000 Wis. L. REV.
205 (discussing the influence of Easterbrook's ideas on other Reagan-appointed judges,
particularly then-Judge Scalia).
162.

See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTmTRUsT LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE

(1976); Frank H. Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics ofFederalism, 26 J.L.& EcoN.
23 (1983); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Antitrust Suits by Targets of Tender
Offers, 80 MIcH. L. REv. 1155 (1982); Frank H. Easterbrook, Is There a Ratchet in
Antitrust Law? 60 Tax. L. REV. 705 (1982); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner,
Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 937 (1981); Richard A. Posner, The
Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 22 CORP. PRAc. CoiM. 583 (1981); Frank H.
Easterbrook et al., Contribution Among Antitrust Defendants: A Legal and Economic
Analysis, 23 J.L. & ECON. 331 (1980); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Should
Indirect Purhcasers Have Standing to Use Under the Antitrust Laws? An Economic
Analysis ofthe Rules of Illinois Brick, 46 U. CHI. L. REv. 602 (1979).
163.
Olympia Equipment Leasing Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 797 F.2d
370 (7th Cir. 1986).
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Easterbrook, through their intellectual powers and penchant for producing
powerful opinions, arguably have increased the prestige of the Seventh
Circuit so
64
that it rivals the Second and D.C. Circuits in terms of influence.
A hot new jurisprudence today is the "new judicial activism" or
"conservative judicial activism," and former law professors are leading adherents
and advocates of the perspective.' 6 Fourth Circuit Chief Judge Harvie Wilkinson
provided a detailed rationalization for this approach in his concurrence in
Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute.'" There he began by observing, "As

this century draws to a close, it seems appropriate to examine the course of its
jurisprudence and the place of this case within it. The decision before us is an
especially difficult one because it pits the obligation to preserve the values of our
federal system against the imperative of judicial restraint."' 67 He then details, in
scholarly fashion, the three waves of judicial activism, including "contemporary"
judicial activism that strikes federal legislation that "exceed[s] Congress' authority
at the expense of states."' 68 He explains how the new judicial activism can survive
where the old failed, because it is free of the weaknesses characteristic of earlier
activism.' 69 The conclusion advocates activism in a writing style more common in
law review articles than appellate opinions.
2. Scholar-Juristsand JudicialInfluence

Two studies of judicial influence and prestige published recently in the
Journal of Legal Studies provide modest support for the hypothesis that legal
academics on the bench take actions that gain them greater individual recognition.
William Landes, Lawrence Lessig, and Michael Solimine conducted a citation
analysis of published opinions of circuit judges who had been on the court for six
or more years at the end of 1995 (a total of 193 judges on the general jurisdiction
circuits plus twelve Federal Circuit judges). 7 Approximately thirteen percent (25
out of 193) of the judges in their study were former law professors. They then
ranked the judges using several different regression models. In the primary model,
164.

Cf. William M. Landes et al., Judicial Influence: A Citation Analysis of

Federal Courts of Appeals Judges, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 271 (1998) (demonstrating the

influence of Posner and Easterbrook on other circuits by way of citation analysis).
165.
See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act
Is a Constitutional Expansion of Rights, 39 WM. & MARY L. REv. 601, 602 (1998)
(describing the federalism decisions as evincing a "conservative judicial activism"); Scott
Fruehwald, If Men Were Angels: The New Judicial Activism in Theory and Practice, 83
MARQ. L. REv. 435 (1999) (examining the new judicial activism by looking at court
decisions adopting the approach and giving special attention to Fourth Circuit Judge
Wilkinson's defense of this approach); Peter M. Shane, Federalism's "Old Deal": What's
Right and Wrong with Conservative Judicial Activism, 45 VILL. L. REV. 201 (2000)
(critiquing the modem era ofjudicial activism).
166.
169 F.3d 820, 889 (4th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (Wilkinson, C.J., concurring).
167.
Id. at 889-90.
168.
Id. at 890-93.

169.

See id. at 893-96.

170.

See Landes et al., supra note 164, at 277.
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they ranked all judges according to their total influence as reflected in outsidecircuit citations.' Twenty percent of the top twenty (including the first and third)
judges were former law professors, more than their percentage in the study.
David Klein and Darby Morrisroe calculated judicial prestige scores,
based on weighted citations, for courts of appeals judges, ranking a sample of 139
circuit judges for the period 1989 through 199.' n Six of the top twenty-five,
including the second, third, and fourth, judges were former academics (or twentyfour percent). 73
The empirical evidence considered here reveals a number of things about
scholar-jurists. When presidents utilize an ideological litmus test in selecting
academics for the appellate bench, the scholar-jurists will behave consistently with
their prior scholarly positions. Academic judges uniformly seek to express their
judicial decisions in writing more often than non-academic judges. And, finally, a
number of academics have succeeded in influencing the development of law
through innovative judicial opinions.
IV. SEEKING INFLUENCE THROUGH JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS

Presidents who seek to influence judicial decisions may look for several
relevant characteristics in potential nominees. Individuals from the same party are
much more likely to vote consistently with the president's ideological perspectives
in close and significant cases. Lawyers who worked as prosecutors will be slightly
more conservative, while those who were elected officials will be slightly more
liberal. Finally, academics who have a published scholarly record of advocating
ideas consistent with the president's will continue their advocacy from the bench.
Will the next President look to the nation's law schools for judges?
Obviously, we can't know for sure. George W. Bush has said that Justice Scalia is
his ideal judge. 74 If Bush idealizes Scalia for his writing ability and consistent
conservatism, then Bush might nominate individuals who share Scalia's
professional background as a full-time law professor and legal scholar.

Presidents who would be inclined to appoint academics must also
consider the potential difficulties scholars may face in the confirmation process. A
president may be hesitant to nominate a law professor with ideological positions
that can be readily scrutinized by potential adversaries, such as members of the
Senate Judiciary Committee or interest groups. Both FDR and Reagan appointed
171.

See id. at 288 tbl.2A.

David Klein & Darby Morrisroe, The Prestige and Influence of Individual
172.
Judges on the U.S. Courts ofAppeals, 28 J. LEGAL STUD.371 (1999).
173.
Id. at 381 tbl.2.
174.
See Alexandra Marks, Abortion Edges Back Toward Center Stage in

Election, CHRISTIAN SC. MoNrroR, July 7, 2000, at 2 (reporting that Bush "praised Justice
Antonin Scalia...as his model justice"); Judy Mann, Taking the Low Road in South
Carolina, WASH. PosT, Feb. 18, 2000, at C11 (observing, in an article following the
Republican presidential campaign, that "Bush has gone on record as saying his two favorite
Supreme Court justices are Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas").
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like-minded academics when the Senate was controlled by their party and thus
more receptive to their nominations. Reagan failed to appoint a law professor to
the courts of appeals during the last two years of his presidency, when the Senate
was controlled by the Democrats, despite three well-publicized attempts. In 1986,
Reagan was forced to withdraw the nomination of University of Texas law
professor Lino Graglia, 75 a well-published critic of the Supreme Court's school
desegregation decisions and an ardent opponent of busing and affirmative
action, 76 and another nominated professor, William Harvey, withdrew.' In 1987,
San Diego law professor Bernard Siegan was rejected by the Senate Judiciary
Committee.' Robert Bork's nomination to the
79 Supreme Court was doomed, in
part, because of his controversial scholarship.
If a president faces a divided government, he might be forced to select
more moderate-or seemingly moderate-judges to ensure judicial confirmation.
In that scenario, academics may be less appealing candidates. Clinton, who taught
briefly at the University of Arkansas Law School, largely stayed away from law
schools in picking nominees to the circuit courts, opting for candidates with less
visible records on legal issues. In one controversial instance, the Washington Post
reported that Clinton decided not to nominate former Georgetown law professor
"Peter Edelman, whom Clinton had personally promised a seat on the D.C. Circuit
See Charlotte Low Allen, Judgment Day for a Judging Panel, INSIGHT ON
Mar. 20, 1989, at 46, 47 (reporting that Graglia charged the ABA with blocking
his nomination because of his opposition to school busing and affirmative action); Lincoln
Caplan, Reagan's Judges Rewrite Legal History, THE RECORD, Feb. 9, 1986, at 1 (arguing
that Reagan advisors wanted to appoint Graglia "because he is as provocative an advocate
for their views as any legal scholar in the country"); UT Professor Dropped As Judge
Choice, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 7, 1986, at 38A. (quoting Graglia's defense of his
positions: "As a professor, I really try to provoke, to take opinions that need taking");
Sheldon Goldman, Reagan's Second Term JudicialAppointments: The Battle at Midway,
70 JUDICATURE 324, 327 n.15 (1987) (relating that the ABA Standing Committee informed
the Reagan Administration that it would rate Graglia as unqualified if he were nominated
and that Bell later agreed with the ABA's evaluation); Judy Wiessler, ScrappingPlanfor
Texan's Judgeship Shows New Caution, HOUSTON CHRON., Aug. 10, 1986 at 21 (examining
Reagan Administration's decision to drop Graglia nomination after negative evaluations by
the ABA and Bell).
176.
See, e.g., LINO A. GRAGLIA, DISASTER BY DECREE: THE SUPREME COURT
DECISIONS ON RACE AND THE SCHOOLS (1976); Lino A. Graglia, From Prohibiting
Segregation to Requiring Integration, in SCHOOL DESEGREGATION: PAST, PRESENT, AND
FUTURE 69 (Walter G. Stephan & Joe R. Feagin eds., 1980); Lino A. Graglia, Racially
DiscriminatoryAdmission to Public Institutionsof HigherEducation, 9 Sw. U. L. REV. 583
(1977); Lino A. Graglia, Special Admission of the "CulturallyDeprived" to Law School,
119 U. PA. L. REv. 351 (1970).
177.
See SCHWARTZ, supra note 5, at 97.
175.

THE NEWS,

178.
See Goldman, supra note 22, at 317-18, 341.
179.
Bork's legal scholarship, specifically his article Neutral PrinciplesandSome
First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971-72), was central to his confirmation
hearings. See Lawrence C. Marshall, Intellectual Feasts and Intellectual Responsibility, 84
Nw. U. L. REv. 832 (1990); ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL
SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 347 (1990).
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court of appeals," after Senate Judiciary Committee Chair Orrin Hatch
"complained that Clinton's friend would be a 'liberal activist' on the bench and
chafed particularly at Edelman's writings about a possible constitutional right to a
guaranteed minimum income." "0
Even if the Senate is friendly, presidents should consider whether former
academics will fail to lead their respective courts. Professors are more likely than
other lawyers to come to the circuit bench with well-defined positions on legal
issues and with less capacity to yield to the views of others in the interest of
collegiality and coalition building. One possible drawback to academics: they may
not be as well-equipped to build collegiality or influence colleagues. Their pride in
intellectual independence may lead to an unwillingness to concede points. Two
well-known Supreme Court justices-William Douglas and Felix Frankfurterwere brilliant academics and judges but failed to lead the Court or build support
for their positions."' Justice Scalia has thus far suffered the same fate.
Even a former law dean may not be able to reach consensus with his
court colleagues. Charles Clark's attempts to bargain with his Second Circuit
colleagues reportedly failed miserably. In particular, Clark's disagreements with
Jerome Frank, a perennial adjunct professor at Yale during Clark's deanship,
would extend for months and often escalate in accusations.n One of Clark's
notable dissents came in a case where he was unwilling to apply a controlling
Second Circuit opinion because it had overruled a decision he reached when
serving as a visiting trial judge in the district court.'8
If history is any guide, future presidents will continue to nominate law
professors to the courts of appeals at a rate disproportionate to their numbers. At
present, twenty-four former law professors are active judges on the courts of
appeals, accounting for approximately seventeen percent of occupied seats. An
additional six are senior judges. To appreciate the significance of those numbers,
you must know that law professors constitute a very small segment of the lawyer
population. More than one million lawyers work in the United States'E4 as

180.

Joan Biskupic, Clinton Avoids Activists in Judicial Selections, VAS1l. POST,

Oct 24, 1995, at Al.
181.

See LAwRENCEBAUM, THEPUZZLEOFJUDICIALBEHAvIOR 1 (1997).

182.
See SCHICK, supra note 135, at 75-76.
183.
See Musher Foundation Inc. v. Alba Trading Co., 127 F.2d 9 (2d Cir. 1942)
(Clark, J. dissenting); Pure Oil Co. v. Puritan Oil Co., 127 F.2d 6 (2d Cir. 1942) (reversing
Clark's trial court decision).
184.
Martindale-Hubbell's directory alone profiles more than 900,000 lawyers
who work in private practice. See Martindale-Hubbell, Martindale-HubbellLaw Directory
in Print (visited Jan. 18, 2001) <http://vww.martindale.omproductsqla\,jdir print.html>.
More than 8900 lawyers are employed by the U.S. Department of Justice, "the world's
largest legal employer." See Department of Justice, Legal Recruitment Programs(visited
Jan. 18, 2001) <http://wwv.usdoj.gov/oapm/Irp.html>; Index of Divisions, (visited Jan. 18,
2001)
<http:llwww.usdoj.govloapmllarhtmlllarbrochnlarbrochlindex.htm>.
State
governments, interest groups, and corporations employ thousands more.
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compared to less than 7000 full-time law professors." 5 The nation'sfive highestgrossing law firms in 1999 employed roughly the same number of lawyers as all

of America's accredited law schools.'86 The total number of stale judges serving in
New York and Texas is about the same as the total number of law professors
working in America's law schools. 87

Given my position as a law professor, I won't argue whether the
appointment of academics to the appeals courts is good or bad for the judicial
system. But, scholar-jurists help make law and courts a fascinating subject of
study.

185.
In 1999-2000, there were 6657 professors employed by the 184 ABAapproved law schools. See Association of American Law Schools, StatisticalReport on Law
School Faculty and Candidatesfor Law FacultyPositions:1999-2000 (visited January 18,
2001) <http://www.aals.org/statistics/index.html#full>, and tbl.IA, <http://wvw.anls.org/
statistics/TIA.htm> (reporting 183 deans, 256 associate deans with professor title, 19
assistant deans with professor title, 4467 professors, 1147 associate professors, and 585
assistant professors). This number includes only those individuals who were considered as
academics in my study; it excludes lecturers, instructors, visiting professors, professors
emeritii, and administrative positions without professorial appointments. If these
individuals are included in the total number, then ABA-approved law schools employ 8827
faculty.
186.
In 1999, the top 5 revenue-earning law firms employed 6664 lawyers. The
American Lawyer, The Am Law 100 America's Highest-Grossing Law Finns in 1999
(visited Jan. 18, 2001) <http://www.law.comspecial/professionals/amlawlO0/amlaw
100 highgross.html> (reporting the following numbers of attorneys were employed by the
five highest-grossing firms in revenue order: Skadden, Arps: 1322; Baker & McKenzie:
2477; Jones, Day: 1213; Latham & Watkins: 900; Shearman & Sterling: 752).
In 1998, 3505 judges sat on state courts in New York, and 2909 judges sat
187.
on state courts in Texas. See Bureau of Justice Statistics, Department of Justice, State Court
Jan.
18,
2001)
1998,
June
2000
(visited
Organization
<http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/sco98.pdf>. These figures include all state courts,
such as appellate, trial, family, probate, and claims courts.
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